Daily Report

East Europe

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CONTENTS

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ALBANIA

Albania: Berisha Addresses Salzburg Economic Summit *[ATA]* 1
Albania: Berisha Comments on NATO Membership, Kosovo Issue *[Tirana Radio]* 1
Albania: Berisha's 'Boycott' of U.S. Embassy Reception Viewed *[POLI I QENDRES 5 Jul, etc.]* ... 1
Albania: Paper Responds to U.S. Diplomat's Protest *[TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE 27, 30 Jun]* 2
Albania: PS Secretary General Submits Resignation *[ATA]* 3
Albania: Meksi, PD Head Meet With Right-Wing Party Leaders *[ATA]* 4
Albania: Republicans Accept PD Proposal To Join New Cabinet *[ATA]* 4
Albania: Zhulali Speaks to IFOR Unit Bound for Germany *[ATA]* 4

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Skopje's Rejection of Sofia Forum Discussed *[KONTINENT 8 Jul]* 6
Bulgaria: Commentary Analyzes Signal Coming From Balkan Forum *[DUMA 8 Jul]* 6
Bulgaria: Russian Envoy Notes 'Symptoms of Stagnation' *[KONTINENT 6 Jul]* 7
Bulgaria: Zhelev Urges West To Consider E. Europe's Defense *[Sofia Radio]* 7
Bulgaria: Official Denies BSP Fears Return of Monarchy *[STANDART NEWS 6 Jul]* 7

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Russian Voters Praised for Election Result *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 8 Jul]* 9
Czech Republic: 'Question Marks' Seen After Russian Election *[LIDOVE NOVINY 8 Jul]* 9
Czech Republic: Parliament Confirms 11 Committee Chairmen *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 8 Jul]* 10

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Commentary Views Visit by Hillary Clinton, Albright *[PRACA 8 Jul]* 11
Slovakia: Report on Hillary Clinton's Remarks About Government *[SME 8 Jul]* 11
Slovakia: NGO's: State TV Distorted Hillary Clinton's Words *[SME 8 Jul]* 12
Slovakia: Commentary Notes Ambassador Albright's Message *[SME 8 Jul]* 12
Slovakia: Yeltsin Victory, Factors for Concern Considered *[NARODNA OBRODA 6 Jul]* 12
Slovakia: Politicians View Russian Elections, Future Relations *[SME 6 Jul]* 14
Slovakia: Comment: Yeltsin Election Did Not End Battle for Kremlin *[PRAVDA 6 Jul]* 14
Slovakia: SDL's Migas Looks Back on Coalition Crisis *[NARODNA OBRODA 2 Jul]* 15
Slovakia: Disagreements in Common Choice Profiled *[PRAVDA 3 Jul, etc.]* 18
Slovakia: Poll: Kovac Trusted More Than Parliament, Government *[SME 6 Jul]* 19
Slovakia: Deputy Speaker Discusses Hungarian Autonomy Appeals *[Bratislava Radio]* 19

HUNGARY

Hungary: Horn Tells Summit Hungary Ready To Join EU *[Budapest Radio]* 21
Hungary: UK Foreign Office Minister on Relations *[FCO On-Line WWW 5 Jul]* 21
Hungary: Government, Hungarians Abroad Issue Communique *[Budapest TV]* 24

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Zubak Interviewed on Federation Relations *[VJESNIK 27, 28 Jun]* 25

B-H: Interior Minister Receives Slovene Officials *[BH PRESS]* 29
B-H: Croats Say Mujahedin Still Active in Muslim Army *[SRNA]* 29
B-H: Gen Delic Tells Mostar Brigade of Need for Strong Army *[Sarajevo Radio]* 29
B-H: Muratovic: Muslims Will Not Vote If Karadzic Around *[Sarajevo TV]* 30
B-H: Spain's Aznar Offers Conditional EU Support for Mostar *[Zagreb Radio]* 30
B-H: Justice Minister Comments on Elections *[NASA BORBA 3 Jul]* 30
B-H: Commentary Recommends Recognition of Border on Drina *[OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 8 Jul]* 32
B-H: Arkan Death Squad Reportedly Out To Get Karadzic *[Vienna KURIER 9 Jul]* 33
B-H: Arkan Dismisses 'Idle Rumors' of Karadzic Arrest Attempt *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 9 Jul]* 34
B-H: OSCE Official Threatens To Exclude SDS From Elections *[Helsinki Radio]* 34
B-H: Klickovic Criticizes 'Undemocratic' Threats Against SDS *[SRNA]* 34
B-H: Bildt Comments on Threat To Bar SDS From Elections *[AFP]* 35
B-H: Serb President To Preside Over New 'Senate' *[SRNA]* 35
B-H: Plavsic Urges Government To Observe Dayton Agreement *[Pale Radio]* 36
B-H: Serb Official: Brcko Key Issue in Resolving Crisis *[Pale TV]* 36
B-H: Radio Lists Candidates for Bosnian Serb President *[Pale Radio]* 36

CROATIA

Croatia: Iranian Ambassador, Economy Minister Hold Talks *[IRNA]* 38
Croatia: Official Rejects 'Regional Approach,' Reintegration *[VECERNJI LIST 7 Jul]* 38
Croatia: U.S., Croatia Said To Disagree About Herzeg-Bosnia *[TANJUG]* 40
Croatia: Opposition Questions Zagreb's Sincerity Toward Bosnia *[Sarajevo Radio]* 41
Croatia: Displaced Krajina Serbs Condemn Tudjman Statement *[TANJUG]* 41
Croatia: Abuse of State Secrecy Discussed *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 29 Jun]* 41
Croatia: Analyst Previews Army Reorganization *[NACIONAL 28 Jun]* 43

POLAND

Poland: Military Daily on Kwasniewski Visit to U.S. *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 8 Jul]* 46
Poland: U.S. Defense Official Visits Polish General Staff *[PAP]* 46
Poland: Government Approves Auschwitz Project, Invites Aid *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 6-7 Jul]* 47
Poland: ROP To Run in Elections Without Solidarity *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 6-7 Jul]* 47

ROMANIA

Romania: Commentary Calls Hillary Clinton Visit 'a Failure' *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 3 Jul]* 49
Romania: Iliescu Returns From Salzburg Economic Summit *[Bucharest Radio]* 50
Romania: Possible End of PDSR-PUNR Accord Viewed *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 29 Jun]* 50

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: Thaler, Croatia's Granic Brief Press on Visit *[Ljubljana Radio]* 52
Slovenia: EC Said To Influence Antinuclear Referendum *[AFP]* 52
Slovenia: Experts Fear SFRY Assets To Be Used To Thank Milosevic *[Ljubljana Radio]* 53
Slovenia: Ljubljana Reportedly To Modify Stand on Succession *[TANJUG]* 53
Slovenia: EU Agreement Boosts Drnovsek's Popularity *[DNEVNIK 26 Jun]* 54
Slovenia: B-H Boycott of Slovene Goods Called 'Irrational' *[DELO 8 Jul]* 54

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: PM Kontic Meets European Statesmen in Salzburg *[TANJUG]* 56
FRY: FM Milutinovic Views Sofia Forum, Bulgarian Minority *[STANDART NEWS 8 Jul]* 56
FRY: Accord Reached With Croatia on POW's, Missing Persons *[Belgrade Radio]* 57

FRY: Government Committee Notes 'Good Cooperation' With IFOR *[TANJUG]* 57

Serbia

Serbia: Government Party Favors Autonomy Solution for Kosovo *[TANJUG]* 58
Serbia: District Court Sentences 2 for War Crimes *[TANJUG]* 58

Kosovo

Kosovo: SPS Official Promises Serbs Defense of Province *[POLITIKA EKSPRES 8 Jul]* 58
Kosovo: Agani Denounces 'Cunning Pragmatism' in JUL Program *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* 59

Albania: Berisha Addresses Salzburg Economic Summit

AU0907093596 Tirana ATA in English 1652 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 8 (ATA)—In his address to the World Economic Forum, which began proceedings in Salzburg on Monday, Albanian President Sali Berisha stressed that the overthrow of communism in Albania had opened up a new long path on which Albania had faced economic, ideological and psychological difficulties.

"Democratic Albania found a ruined infrastructure. Integration and market economy have been among the key priorities of our policy," Berisha said.

"Albania has been striving to be a factor of peace, stability and development in Eastern Europe," he said.

Berisha considered the efforts for NATO membership one of the most vital engagements of Albania. The strategy employed in Bosnia was an important step of NATO.

"I might say Albania has been one among the first countries to demand NATO membership, not because it was the most prepared one to join the alliance but because it considered it an effort to eliminate as soon as possible the existing political differences.

"Partnership for Peace was a very significant initiative to ensure security in our country. Albania has not only offered NATO its moral contribution but has also put at its disposal facilities to carry out operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"The partnership for Peace Initiative is not merely a military initiative, it has political values, it helps increase confidence between the neighboring and non neighboring countries and between those considered friends."

Referring to security issues in the Balkan region, Berisha especially dwelt on the Dayton accord, which he considered very important to put an end to the war and ruin plans of creating the Greater Serbia.

He analysed the events in the Balkan peninsula and put the stress on the Kosova issue. He said this problem had been important since the beginning of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

Berisha insisted that the Kosova issue be included in the agenda of talks because, he said, pressure and oppression in Kosova might lead to an explosive situation there and in the Balkans.

"Dialogue between Prishtina [Pristina] and Belgrade is necessary in the presence of a third side. The establishment of an international supervising force would enable a peaceful solution," Berisha concluded.

Albania: Berisha Comments on NATO Membership, Kosovo Issue

AU0807175796 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Cooperation and security in the Balkans were the focus of President Berisha's speech at the economic forum that opened in Salzburg, Austria, yesterday.

Addressing the economic summit, the Albanian president said the meeting presented an opportunity to improve cooperation among former communist countries and beyond. Berisha considered the economic forum a contribution to the creation of a new Europe that exerts its influence by creating a Balkan region ruled by peace and stability.

During his speech, President Berisha insisted that the Kosova issue be included on the agenda as Serbian pressure may make the situation explosive. Berisha said the dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade confirmed the need for the presence of a third party.

An international observers mission would create the fundamental possibilities for a peaceful solution, President Berisha stressed.

One of the most vital commitments, Berisha later confirmed in his speech, was to prepare for membership in the NATO alliance. Albania was one of the first countries to request membership in the alliance, not only because it was the most prepared to join the alliance but considering its efforts to expeditiously eliminate the current political changes. [sentence as heard]

Berisha said the Partnership for Peace was not only a military initiative but that it had political values which would serve to promote trust among neighboring and nonneighboring countries and among those who are considered to be friends.

President Berisha and the delegation accompanying him to Salzburg are expected to return home this afternoon.

Albania: Berisha's 'Boycott' of U.S. Embassy Reception Viewed

AU0807184196

[FBIS Report] The Tirana opposition papers POLI I QENDRES and ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian carry on 5 July critical comment on President Berisha's failure to attend the 4 July reception at the U.S. Embassy.

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A. Mai, in a 500-word commentary published on page three of POLI I QENDRES under the headline "Presidential Boycott of the U.S. Embassy," writes: "The predictions came true. Berisha did not go to congratulate the staff of the U.S. Embassy on the 220th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. It was not like a year ago, when the president attended a reception hosted by the then Ambassador Lake. Two other senior state personalities, the just appointed Parliamentary Chairman Pjeter Arbnori and the candidate for prime minister Aleksander Meksi, were also absent along with Berisha. In their place, the Albanian state was represented by the party that keeps it going: Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Tritan Shehu was the most senior party figure at yesterday's reception. The absence of the Berisha-Meksi-Arbnori trio justified those who have claimed that the president will resort to strong language in response to the critical statements of the United States over the 26 May elections and to the absence of U.S. diplomats from the opening session of the new parliament. To use a favorite word of his, Berisha yesterday decided on a 'boycott.' ["Bojkot" is used by Berisha instead of the usual Albanian "bojkotim"]. In addition to the absence of senior politicians, yesterday afternoon's long-expected reception did not offer any other surprises. One had the impression that time had stood still since the previous reception a year ago. The invitation list was the same, while the faces that have appeared in politics since the 26 May elections were not present. Mrs. Qirko, the pliable deputy chairman of the assembly, who in her maiden speech solemnly announced that the PD deputies will bring up the four-year-old toddlers of democracy until they are 18, i.e., for no more and no less than four and a half terms of office, was not present, either. The absence of the head of state from the U.S. Embassy reception reconfirms the crisis that bilateral relations have been undergoing since the parliamentary elections. So far, the U.S. Government has made three very critical statements about the elections and the manner in which they were conducted. The United States has still not produced a political formula to solve the problem, but has said that the irregularities and those responsible for them must be exposed. To say the least, this has not pleased the Tirana government. Mr. Berisha's absence from the reception could be a sure sign that the U.S. criticisms and suggestions will not be borne in mind in the future. We could therefore be faced with unexpected political development, whose cost remains unknown."

ZERI I POPULLIT carries on page one an unattributed 200-word item under the headline, "After Criticisms From the World's Largest Democracy, a State Boycott of the United States' National Day?" which states: "This is not the first time that Albanian officials have seen in the United States not a friend but an opponent trampling on the country's sovereignty. The fact is that no official of the U.S. Embassy in Tirana took part in the opening session of the new parliament, which, as we know, was assembled following the theft of the people's votes on 26 May. The staff of the embassy stated that they could not attend and create the impression that were no problems with the recent elections. This stance followed several statements and letters from senior U.S. authorities denouncing the scandalous rape of the Albanians' free votes on 26 May. It was apparently in response to this that senior Albanian figures did not attend the celebrations organized at the U.S. Embassy yesterday afternoon, at which dozens of other political personalities and friends and well-wishers of the United States were present. The Editorial Board does not possess information about the real reasons for the state boycott of the United States' national day. However, common sense tells us that this is a disgraceful response to the well-meaning criticisms of the U.S. Administration."

Albania: Paper Responds to U.S. Diplomat's Protest
AU0807202296

[FBIS Report] Tirana TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian on 27 June publishes on page 3 an unattributed 250-word article entitled "Political Prostitute," attacking Miranda Gace, director of the Association for Democratic Culture. Following protests over this article by Carl Siebentritt of the U.S. Embassy, the same paper publishes on 30 June on page 1 a 400-word "Press Statement by the Newspaper TRIBUNA" defending its earlier article and criticizing Siebentritt's "threatening tones."

TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE's article of 27 June, entitled "Political Prostitute," states: "Sources within the Association for Democratic Culture report that Miranda Gace, the intimate colleague of one of the most aggressive members of the Albanian Workers Party Politburo in its final years, has been paid $40,000 by the extremists of the Greek-American lobby to slander the elections in Albania.

"The same sources within this association state that Mrs. Gace had a single mission during the election campaign, which was to deceive the international public about the mass media in Albania. In an act of political prostitution, this manipulator of public opinion has shamelessly announced that Albanian Television supported only the ruling Democratic Party [PD] during the election campaign.

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"In fact, Albanian Television presented the faces of the leaders of the Red Front twice as often as the leaders of the PD, but this did not prevent the lady from performing the task she undertook, if necessary by spreading slander and disinformation and manipulating the truth.

"It has meanwhile been reported that the Arben Broci Foundation has decided to sue Mrs. Gace for slander and disinformation. The lady, who may now have to defend herself against the charges made against her, will no doubt have defense lawyers from the extremists of the lobby that paid her, but we believe that the free verdict of Albanian justice will make Mrs. Gace return the $40,000 she received for her political prostitution. We will in the meantime inform readers at length about Mrs. Gace's activities in our forthcoming issues."

On 30 June, the item entitled "Press Statement by the Newspaper TRIBUNA," signed by Director Shemsi Peposhi and Editor in Chief Arben Cejku, reads:

"On 28 June, the U.S. diplomat in Tirana, Mr. Carl Siebentritt, summoned through his translator TRIBUNA Editor in Chief Arben Cejku to the U.S. Embassy. At this meeting, in threatening tones unusual for a diplomat, he asked Mr. Cejku for an explanation of the article entitled 'Political Prostitute' published in the paper on 27 June. In this article, TRIBUNA's correspondent denounced the immoral manipulation of the electoral process in Albania carried out by Mrs. Miranda Gace, the former intimate colleague of the most aggressive member of the Politburo in the final years of the communist regime and currently the director of the Association for Free Elections and Democratic Culture. The diplomat Siebentritt announced to Editor in Chief Cejku in a threatening fashion that the article had been translated and sent to the U.S. Government, and, after speaking out in defense of Mrs. Gace's career, denied the contents of the article. In connection with the above, the Editorial Board of the independent newspaper TRIBUNA states as follows:

"1. The newspaper TRIBUNA possesses proof and facts for its article 'Political Prostitute,' and knows that the Arben Broci Foundation will soon put all these facts before the court, because it has sued Mrs. Gace for slander in favor of the Albanian communists (the Red Front). Mr. Siebentritt will have the opportunity to fully acquaint himself with these facts.

"2. The Arben Broci Foundation monitored the media during the electoral process. In its statement of 20 May, this foundation denounced with facts the favor shown toward the leaders of the 'Red Front' during the electoral campaign. In the same statement, the Arben Broci Foundation denounced Mrs. Gace as a manipulator of the electoral process in favor of the Albanian communists (the Red front) and invited her to put her facts next to those of the foundation.

"3. The Editorial Board of the newspaper TRIBUNA invites Mr. Siebentritt to refute our article in the pages of this newspaper, and assures him that we will always be open to him. However, this newspaper cannot accept his pressure on the paper to denounce an article that does not involve him at all. This pressure is a violation not only of the rules of behavior of a diplomat in a free country but of the First Amendment of the Constitution of his own country, which for us men of the press is valid not only in the United States but universally.

"4. We finally wish to remind Mr. Siebentritt and the public that the Arben Broci Foundation and the newspaper TRIBUNA, although preserving their clear anticommunist stance, are a foundation and a newspaper that respect other people's convictions. It is this respect that has led the newspaper to ignore as unimportant the information repeated by students of December [1990] about the active role of a certain diplomat in the creation of the Red Front and the distribution of electoral constituencies among the parties of this front in the interests of the extremists of the Greek lobby and their supporters. Nevertheless, the Albanian voters gave the best answer to these efforts on 26 May and 16 June."

Albania: PS Secretary General Submits Resignation

AU0807165796 Tirana ATA in English 1548 GMT 8 Jul 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 8 (ATA)—Secretary General of Socialist Party [PS] Gramoz Ruci, through a fax addressed Monday to the PS Steering Committee, gathered to discuss the motion of its chairman, Fatos Nano, for the party's reformation and its congress, asked his "irrevocable resignation from all the party's leading functions."

"Because of the present political situation, I consider it appropriate to declare before the whole public opinion my resignation from all leading functions of the Socialist Party," Ruci says in the letter bearing the date of July 7, in Kurvelesh, (where he says is on holidays at his relatives and unable to come to Tirana).

His resignation was accepted by those present.

"I have served the PS leadership with devotion, and I present my resignation as a normal act for the same thing, to serve the Socialist Party," said Ruci, considered until yesterday the strong arm of chairman Fatos Nano.

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Ruci, who was interior minister during Ramiz Alia's regime, was involved in the April 2, 1991 bloodshed in the city of Shkoder, where four people were killed and 35 others wounded, has been PS secretary general charged with its organisation and cadre.

"I guarantee all sympathizers that my performance as a party member and citizen is clean," says Ruci, often summoned regarding the inquiries into the Shkoder massacre.

He left the party "on holidays" precisely on the eve of "the renewal motion" and after the new parliament started work, a moment which also marked the expiry of his mandate as deputy.

Albania: Meksi, PD Head Meet With Right-Wing Party Leaders

AU0907093396 Tirana ATA in English 1853 GMT 8 Jul 96

[Report by A. Sakja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 8 (ATA)—The two chairmen of the new government cabinet, the reappointed Premier Aleksander Meksi and Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Tritan Shehu, who will also hold the post of the deputy premier, continued consultative meetings on Monday [8 July] with political party leaders on matters of structure, organisation, programme, and composition of the new government they lead.

"We carried out the consultations to listen to each party's problems, their aims for a cooperation at various levels in the government and their proposals of a better governing than so far," said Premier Meksi, reappointed prime minister and charged by the president of the Republic on Saturday [6 July] with the formation of the new government, after winning the confidence vote of the PD National Council.

Shehu considered this a dialogue with the majority of the Albanian political forces, getting their views.

The democrat leader expressed the belief that the new government "will be remembered as a government which will finally pull the country out of the transition period and lead it towards the European developed countries."

In the three meetings on Monday, Meksi and Shehu received leaders of two right wing parties, "Levizja e Legalitetit" [Legality Movement] and the "Albanian Democratic Union," as well as of the Agrarian Party, positioned in the Albanian policy left spectrum.

The chairman of the Party "Levizja e Legalitetit," Guri Durollari, who positively considered the meeting, however showed reserves to the press about its development.

The Albanian Democratic Union Party was more correct in its suggestions. Its chairman, Remzi Ndreu, said that "We share many views with the PD so that the next government corrects the errors of the last four years and serve the consolidation of the democratic institutions."

Ndreu called for "more efficient ministries and a greater control on the local government."

At this meeting, the chairman of the Agrarian Party, Lufter Xhuveli, dwelt on suggestions on the agrarian politics and the drafting of a long-term strategy for the development of agriculture.

Albania: Republicans Accept PD Proposal To Join New Cabinet

AU0907084996 Tirana ATA in English 1947 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 8 (ATA)—The Republican Party [PR] National Council by a majority of votes accepted the invitation of the Democratic Party [PD] to take part in the new government, which is being created.

In his speech, the Republican chairman Sabri Godo did not pronounce himself on the PD invitation to take part in the country's governing in order not to influence on the council.

Deputy Chairman Mediu and Secretary General Mingomataj expressed themselves in favour of the participation in the new government. Mingomataj considered the participation of the Republicans in the government worthier than in the parliament.

The two parties, the PD and the PR, will soon discuss the level of cooperation in the new government.

The participation of the Republican Party in the new government is an expression of PD 's efforts to create a coalition government, on a broader basis.

Albania: Zhulali Speaks to IFOR Unit Bound for Germany

AU0907094596 Tirana ATA in English 0825 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 9 (ATA)—Albanian peacekeeping troops left, Monday [8 July], for Germany, Defence Ministry press and information office said. Defence Minister Safet Zhulali, Chief of the Army General Staff General Sheme Kosova and other high ranking officials of this ministry and the German Ambassador in Tirana Mr. Disdorm attended the ceremony organised in this occasion.

Zhulali greeted the troops on behalf of Albanian President and Army's Commander in Chief Sali Berisha. He

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said that the Albanian Army is moving a step forward in its new mission, in its participation in the peacekeeping activities. Zhulali called Albania's participation in the IFOR [Implementation Force] forces a continuity in the contribution Albania is offering for peace and stability in the region. The participation of an Albanian company in these forces is a great achievement of the democratic developments of democratic Albania and its total transformation of the Albanian army. He thanked the German government and Defence Minister Ruehe. Then speaking to the troops, Zhulali said: "You are going for the final training to Germany, Albania's most important friend."

Albania's participation in such missions is result of freedom and democracy, Zhulali said. The peacekeeping forces said they would fulfill their duty and represent the Albanian army with devotion and showing high spirit of responsibility.

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Bulgaria: Skopje's Rejection of Sofia Forum Discussed

AU0907113296 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 8 Jul 96 p 2

[Article by Elena Trifonova and Plamen Kulinski]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first all-Balkan foreign ministers meeting since the signing of the Dayton peace agreement ended in Sofia with a declaration that carried seven rather than eight signatures. The document lacked the signature of our neighbor, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM], which, after prolonged vacillation, declined to take part only hours before the forum opened.

On the evening of Friday, 5 July, Skopje telephoned to recall its delegation because of the name on its place card on the negotiating table. In an ensuing declaration, Macedonia accused Bulgaria of supporting Greece by not accepting the Macedonian suggestion that the cards carry the national flag and the names of the delegation leaders. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry pointed out that it had been agreed in advance that bilateral issues would not be discussed. The United Nations has admitted this country as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and it should use this name at international forums, despite the fact that Bulgaria was the first country to recognize it as the Republic of Macedonia, a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry official told KONTINENT. Observers note that recently Macedonia has caused strain in its relations with Bulgaria, and its actions can be interpreted as a lack of gratitude for Sofia's efforts in helping to establish it as an independent state in the international arena.

At the final news conference of the Sofia forum, a Skopje television journalist asked the Bulgarian, FRY, and Greek foreign ministers, in English, whether the meeting could be regarded as successful inasmuch as one of the Balkan countries did not take part. Foreign Minister Pirinski wanted to answer him also in English but thought he would be understood better in Bulgarian. His Greek counterpart, Theodhoros Pangalos, answered in English, apologizing for not knowing Bulgarian. FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic also answered in English.

The gist of the three answers was that it would be better, of course, if all of the representatives of the region gathered at the roundtable, but nothing could be done if Macedonia decided not to take part. They expressed the hope that Skopje would send its representative to the next meeting, to be held in Greece next year.

Neighbors are best when they gather together around the same table, added Onur Yoymen [name as transliterated], the first deputy foreign minister of Turkey, which, according to some rumors, supports Skopje on the question of the country's name.

In his speech at the forum, Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos started by addressing his Bulgarian colleague Pirinski as "Mr. President." Asked later if he addressed the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] presidential candidate thus as a representative of the Greek Government, of PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement], or in his own name, Pangalos answered: "I was thinking of my hope for the future."

Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, and Italy sent their representatives to the meeting, as did the member countries of the Contact Group for Bosnia. U.S. President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali sent messages with greetings.

Bulgaria: Commentary Analyzes Signal Coming From Balkan Forum

AU0807180796 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Jul 96 p 7

[Commentary by Petur Bochukov: "Dialogue Filled With Many Possibilities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This time the skeptics have to keep quiet. The signal that the Sofia meeting of the Balkan foreign ministers has sent to the world is positive and clear. It contains both a sober assessment and hope, despite the crisis we are experiencing and the accumulated distrust and difficulties in organizing such a responsible forum with so many countries taking part.

The initiative was a Bulgarian one, and it was successfully carried out. For some of the participants, the very fact that the meeting took place is a mark of its success. Following the tragedy in Bosnia and after the exhausting embargo against the FRY, the present active all-Balkan dialogue is replete with many possibilities. The first reason for this is the wealth of new ideas and specific projects contained in the Sofia declaration, which was adopted unanimously and to whose drafting even the diplomats of the only country absent from the meeting—namely, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]—made a contribution. Second, it is due to the wide interest shown in the present phase of the dialogue, renewed after a six-year suspension, by countries outside the region, many international organizations, and world institutions; and third, because of the shared interests in integrating into the Euro-Atlantic economic and military-political structures.

Macedonia's refusal to participate in the Sofia meeting arouses certain feelings of regret because the pretext

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of self-isolation is only a formal one in the view of the other participants, and the common future is unthinkable without compromises.

The Dayton agreement, which brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bitter experience of ethnic and religious intolerance, and the preventative measures in Kosovo open up opportunities for a truly constructive start in the Balkans. The Sofia meeting is the first step in this direction. It will certainly be followed by others. The last two days in Sofia inspire us with optimism about this.

Bulgaria: Russian Envoy Notes 'Symptoms of Stagnation'

AU0807150496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 6 Jul 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Yovka Dimitrova: "Avdeyev Apologized for Anti-Bulgarian Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The anti-Bulgarian comments printed in the Russian media do not reflect Moscow's official policy or Boris Yeltsin's personal views, Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev assured President Zhelev on 5 July.

Avdeyev reportedly told Georgi Pirinski the same thing, saying that Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin disassociate themselves from the anti-Bulgarian articles and reports.

The Russian newspapers ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and the Itogi program on Russian Independent Television cited us as an example of how badly people live under the neocommunists. They claimed the Russians could expect the same if they voted for Zyuganov.

The reports were paid for by Yeltsin's campaign headquarters, according to informed sources. Later, a source from the Russian Foreign Ministry told KONTINENT: "We had nothing to do with this."

Ambassador Avdeyev reportedly told President Zhelev yesterday that the Kremlin is alarmed by "symptoms of stagnation in Bulgarian-Russian relations." Moscow wants the joint projects to be implemented more quickly. Subjective and bureaucratic reasons are supposedly delaying the joint initiatives. Avdeyev pointed out that conditions are unsatisfactory for attracting foreign investments. He is reported to have given the president a detailed explanation of the state of the gas project and the stage that talks have reached on the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline.

President Zhelev agreed that more effective contacts are needed, Ambassador Avdeyev reported. The head of state handed the ambassador a message of congratulations for Yeltsin on his reelection.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Urges West To Consider E. Europe's Defense

AU0807175896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In Salzburg today, the second day of the two-day economic forum on the topic Central and East Europe on the Eve of a New Era, the sessions were devoted to the economic and political priorities for economic growth, regional security problems, and European integration.

In his statement yesterday, Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev noted indirectly that political and economic problems will prevent our country from joining Europe and NATO, and urged the West not to neglect the defense needs of the countries that are moving more tardily toward European political, economic, and military structures.

Bulgaria: Official Denies BSP Fears Return of Monarchy

AU0807153996 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 6 Jul 96 p 7

[Interview with Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, by Neda Popova; place and date not given: "The Coburg-Gotha Dynasty Has No Future in Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popova] Mr. Purvanov, some claim that the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] can see Simeon on the throne in the not-so-distant future. Is there such a report, and if so, what does it say?

[Purvanov] I am greatly surprised. When a national daily mentions the BSP in a headline and refers to a position held by the party as a whole, it should imply that the author is referring to an official party document. The quotations in the report are extremely distorted. The paper in question is part of a scholarly work. Under no circumstances can documents drafted by persons from our scientific units commit the party leadership in any way. It cannot be said that the BSP advocates a monarchy. We declared our position regarding the future of the monarchy long ago. Our position is that the monarchy, and the Coburg-Gotha dynasty in particular, has no future in Bulgaria.

[Popova] But the document states that if the crisis continues in Bulgaria, Simeon would be regarded as the

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messiah who will save our native land. Are there such worries in the BSP leadership?

[Purvanov] The quotation is inaccurate. I will reiterate that the recent visit by Simeon Coburg-Gotha to Bulgaria showed that he is primarily regarded as an historical figure. With the exception of certain overcommitted political figures, no voices were heard hailing Simeon as a messiah. On the contrary, even Simeon himself stressed that no one should place big hopes on him.

[Popova] Can you shed any light on whether any BSP leaders met with Simeon during his visit to Bulgaria?

[Purvanov] I have no information on any meeting between BSP leaders and Simeon Coburg-Gotha. I can definitely say that no BSP leader or any representative of the Socialists is authorized to hold such a meeting. If any such contact took place at all, it was of a personal nature.

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Czech Republic: Russian Voters Praised for Election Result

AU0807160796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 8 Jul 96 p 6

[Commentary by Jiri Doubrava: "The Russians Voted With Courage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian elections are over, but it is not quite true that the victorious Yeltsin won them. On the contrary, it is quite plain that Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party, lost them.

The Russians, at least a large part of them, voted not for anyone but against someone. Yeltsin's low level of popularity is in clear contrast to his stately election result. In the end, the Russian elections were a textbook example of why a voter votes for someone he does not particularly like. He is simply choosing the lesser of two evils.

When all is said and done, the Russians voted against a return to the old times. Many of them did this with a certain vacillation because the former era meant for them at least basic certainty, and they do not know what tomorrow will bring. They consider that 2 or 3 percent of their neighbors are growing rich unashamedly, but they do not know how they will pay the rent. Despite this, they have voted to continue the reforms.

The Russian elections are also significant in the sense that they took place in an atmosphere that can be described as relatively democratic. It is necessary to have many reservations about how the election campaign was conducted. First and foremost, this involves the priority given to Yeltsin on television. Nevertheless, the actual election act, with a few exceptions that could occur elsewhere in the world, was without visible signs of cheating, and the overall result was not influenced.

Russia obviously parted definitively with communism on Wednesday during the second round of presidential elections. That is not to say that the communists will not continue to play an important role on the Russian political scene. They have a majority in parliament, even though it has only limited authority. The two-fifths of voters who voted for the communist candidate are also not to be sneezed at. Of course, the majority of the Russian population deserves admiration for having acceded voluntarily to future difficulties and the pain of the reforms that await it. The Russian people voted for Yeltsin, although it is clear to them that he will not, in all probability, be their president for the whole of the next four years. They voted against what they no longer want.

Czech Republic: 'Question Marks' Seen After Russian Election

AU0807171896 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 8 Jul 96 p 8

[Commentary by Stanislav Drahny: "Will Their Good Choice Last the Russians Until the Year 2000?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the Russian presidential elections, the voters renounced, at least this time, the possibility of a return to communism. The incumbent president, Boris Yeltsin, triumphed over communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov. So, the question of who will sit in the Kremlin for the next four years has been resolved satisfactorily and according to expectations.

At the same time, however, other question marks have popped up. Following Yeltsin's convincing victory, what will happen to General Lebed, whom the president promised all sorts of things—perhaps even the post of vice president—after the first round of elections, in an attempt to win over his voters? How will this ambitious soldier put up with old-new Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, whose authority may be affected? Will the proreform politician and economist Yavlinskiy be in the new government? And, finally, what is Yeltsin's actual state of health? Angina pectoris, cirrhosis of the liver, or, as the president's closest aides are claiming, just a neglected cold? All of these are important puzzles, and the solution to them will raise even more questions.

Regardless of these ambiguities, the world has definitely welcomed the Russians' choice. The majority of politicians have expressed unequivocally and almost apolitically their support for Yeltsin and their conviction that the Russian people have opted for stability and freedom. For example, according to the U.S. President, the Russians "have passed a milestone on the path toward democracy."

Despite all of these wishes, Russia, following Yeltsin's reelection, will not become a country whose policy will be fully democratic and easy to read; nevertheless, it will undoubtedly be easier to anticipate. For the countries of Central Europe and, thus, the Czech Republic, too, the election result brings more much needed time for development, uninterrupted by anything from the outside, and gives them an opportunity to anchor themselves firmly in the Western economic, political, and military structures. There have not been many opportunities like this in Czech history, and it would be a sin not to take advantage of it.

There is never enough time to spare, and, in the end, there does not even have to be as much as we think. Namely, it has not been said anywhere that the development toward democracy in Russia is irreversible

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and that the arrangement of the political scene that arose from these elections will indeed last until the year 2000.

Czech Republic: Parliament Confirms 11 Committee Chairmen

AU0807131096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 8 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by "(kac)": "The Chamber Has Confirmed the Committee Chairmen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Chamber of Deputies on Thursday [4 July] confirmed definitively, without passionate debates and in a quite calm atmosphere, all 11 of the committee chairmen the deputies elected at the constituent meetings. The deputies voted separately on each of the candidates; there was no vote on the chairman of the Organization Committee because, by law, this post is filled by the Chamber chairman.

Only Communist Deputy Vaclav Exner spoke before the vote: He announced that his club did not support the confirmation of the chairmen. In his speech, he also accused the Social Democrats of allowing themselves to be [illegible]med by the coalition, as they have backed down from their demand that the communists and the republicans also be represented in the leading posts in the Chamber and the committees.

The Chamber also elected the members of its permanent delegations on Thursday and thus decided who will represent it abroad. The republicans and the communists are in none of them, despite campaigning for them. Immediately after their chairman, Miroslav Sladek, was not elected a member of the permanent delegation in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the republicans withdrew their candidates for the other bodies. Apart from all of the members of his party, 17 Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] deputies, 22 Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] deputies, and seven Civic Democratic Party [ODS] representatives also voted in favor of Sladek's membership in the delegation. All of the communists, but also 46 Social Democrats, 10 Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] deputies, and six Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] deputies voted for the participation of KSCM Deputy Chairman Miloslav Ransdorf in the delegation.

So, the majority of the delegations are now one member short; the vote on these members will have to be taken at one of the future sessions of the Chamber.

The Newly Elected Chairmen of the Parliamentary Committees

Organizational Committee: Chamber and CSSD Chairman Milos Zeman

Mandate and Immunity Committee: Anna Roschova (ODS)

Petition Committee: Former Justice Minister Jiri Novak (ODS)

Budget Committee: Jozef Wagner (CSSD)

Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee: ODS Deputy Chairman Libor Novak

Defense and Security Committee: Former Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas (ODS)

Economic Committee: Josef Holub (ODS)

Agriculture Committee: CSSD Deputy Chairman Karel Machovec

Committee for Public Administration, Regional Development, and the Environment: Vaclav Gruhlich (CSSD)

Committee for Social Policy and Health Care: Vladimir Spidla (CSSD)

Committee for Science, Education, Culture, Youth, and Physical Training: Michal Prokop (ODA)

Foreign Committee: Former Defense Minister Vilem Holan (KDU-CSL)

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Slovakia: Commentary Views Visit by Hillary Clinton, Albright

AU0807141096 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 8 Jul 96 p 5

[Commentary by Balazs Tarjan: "Not at All a Courtesy Visit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. President's wife is not a diplomat. We could consider her visit [on 6 July] as a pure courtesy visit, had the U.S. First Lady's remarks not been undiplomatically unequivocal and had Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who accompanied her, not interpreted, from her position, the U.S. Administration's official stances.

In their assessments yesterday, world news agencies already called the seven-hour visit "the United States' most aggressive diplomatic step toward the Slovak Republic." No wonder, when we consider that the roundtable with representatives of nongovernmental organizations was included on the agenda of the visit at the expressed request of the U.S. Embassy, not to mention the fact that the U.S. First Lady described the issue of the foundations' status as a specific problem in Slovakia. "It often happens that people doing what they consider to be correct and for the country's benefit do not wish to be subjected to necessary criticism that goes hand in hand with democracy," Hillary Clinton said. The Americans are very sensitive to the so-called third sector, that is, civic associations and organizations, which they consider to be an inseparable part of a democratic society and which should, in their opinion, also play this role in the Slovak Republic. This is why the U.S. President's wife could scarcely respond with understanding to the Slovak law on foundations, which allows the state to interfere in their activity to a significant extent. Therefore, it was not by coincidence that she expressed her conviction that the Slovak Government should reassess its current opposition toward the third sector.

It was, above all, thanks to Madeleine Albright that all the concerns contained in the previous demarches of the European organizations and the United States were raised again during the visit. This great power's ambassador to the United Nations clearly rejected the view that there exists in her country an incorrect opinion about developments in our country. Besides assuring Slovak officials that the U.S. Administration continues to consider the Slovak Republic's entry into Euroatlantic structures to be important, she expressed vigorous disagreement with certain initiatives that are being assessed as steps against democracy. Whether she mentioned the politicizing of Slovak public television, the Penal Code amendment, the prepared bill on universities, or the recently passed law on foundations, she spoke about all of them in the sense that they could undermine the Slovak Republic's steps toward admission into NATO.

When we consider the different positions of the U.S. First Lady and the ambassador to the United Nations, the fact that the ambassador insisted on separate meetings with the president and the prime minister is also telling. Obviously, it was she, and not the President's wife, who was communicating the official positions. Her words that nothing in NATO has been decided yet and that the decision [on admission of new NATO members] will be made in the first half of next year could be regarded as a certain encouragement. Considering the remainder of her message, however, and in context with previous demarches and diplomatic warnings, it was, in fact, a raised finger: Nothing is lost but, in certain matters regarding the development of democracy, you will have to set your own house in order. While, in her message broadcast by Radio Free Europe before her visit to Bratislava, Hillary Clinton voiced the conviction that democracy was not a static phenomenon, but a never-ending process and that her visit was an expression of the United States' support for democratic development in Slovakia, Madeleine Albright stated unambiguously: "The United States is interested in the Slovak Republic joining the community of democratic countries. But becoming part of this community is no gift. It has to be deserved."

Slovakia: Report on Hillary Clinton's Remarks About Government

AU0807171396 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Jul 96 p 1

[Article by Michal Havran: "Unofficial Politician Hillary Clinton Was Not Silent at the Bratislava 'Roundtable'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "She will be silent," journalists "covering" U.S. First Lady Hillary Clinton's Saturday's [6 July] visit to Bratislava had been saying. She was not. Initially, the obligatory smile prevailed on this unofficial politician's face. Later, as she was getting into shape, the smile became friendly. She broke her "silence" at the roundtable with representatives of Slovak nongovernmental organizations. In an ardent voice, she said: "It often happens that people doing what they consider to be correct for the country's benefit do not wish to be subjected to criticism that goes hand in hand with democracy." These were clear words directed not only at the Slovak Government's attitude toward Slovak foundations. The roundtable discussion in the concert hall of the Bratislava Reduta building was moderated by U.S. Ambassador Ralph Johnson personally, which is telling in itself. Representatives of 22 nongovernmental

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organizations, called NGO's in English, spoke with the First Lady particularly about their difficulties, about the present government's restrictive practices against foundations. Juraj Zamkovsky compared the pressure on the third sector, which culminated in the passage of the strict law, with the practices of the former totalitarian regime. Hillary was speaking about the need for mutual trust among citizens who had decided to build an open civic society and about the need for responsibility: "In America, responsibility has been created by the citizens, not the government. I have been working myself in foundations for women, children, and handicapped people and I know how important mutual help is. The government must know that foundations are its partners. I hope that you will learn this in Slovakia. You just need more time. We have been doing this in America for 220 years. Democracy is a never-ending process."

Slovakia: NGO's: State TV Distorted Hillary Clinton's Words

AU0807181196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by "r": "Nongovernmental Organizations' Protest Against Slovak Television's Reporting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The participants in the Slovak NGO forum with Hillary R. Clinton, the U.S. President's wife, protest "against the manipulation of STV [Slovak Television] viewers in Saturday's main evening newscast 'Dnes' [Today]." According to the participants in the forum, which was attended by representatives of 22 Slovak nongovernmental organizations, "the STV completely distorted statements by the U.S. First Lady on the relationship between governments and civic organizations in democratic countries." In the opinion of the participants in the meeting, "the television farce of STV news reflects, apart from the deep decline of the STV's professionalism, also the long-term position of its management as the servile servant of the present ruling power in Slovakia."

Slovakia: Commentary Notes Ambassador Albright's Message

AU0807152996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Jul 96 p 4

[Commentary by Ivan Kuhn: "Let Us Not Yield to Misconceptions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There was a time when months went by without any visits from prominent Western representative. When something did come from the West, it was either a demarche (twice from the EU, once from the United States) or a European Parliament resolution. This gave rise to the myth in Slovakia that the West is misinformed about our country's political situation because all reports on developments in the Slovak Republic come from either the opposition, the "antigovernment" media, or foreign journalists writing about Slovakia from Prague, Budapest, or Vienna.

Over the last few months, we have witnessed a major change in Slovakia. Within a short period of time, Prime Minister Meciar has had the opportunity (that is, of course, if he was not out inspecting the construction of a highway somewhere) to defend the policies of the ruling coalition in face-to-face talks with many distinguished Western politicians and diplomats. Astonishingly, none of them told journalists, following talks with the prime minister, that only now he understands what is really going on in Slovakia. EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek said they are well informed about the situation from their representative office in Slovakia and from the embassies of EU member countries. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana only tersely stated that he heard everything the prime minister wanted to tell him. Karsten Voigt, chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly, pointed out that not only will the West have to alter its perception of the reality in Slovakia, but the political reality in the Slovak Republic will need to be altered as well. On Saturday, Vladimir Meciar had the opportunity to present his interpretation of the Slovak reality to a high-ranking American diplomat, Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who accompanied First Lady Hillary Clinton during her stay in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. While the First Lady's visit was primarily a courtesy, Madeleine Albright held separate talks with the Slovak president and the prime minister. The talk with the prime minister lasted half an hour longer than planned, causing Ambassador Albright to miss the walk through the Old City with the First Lady. Yet she "made it very clear" to Prime Minister Meciar "that the primary condition for NATO entry is genuine [previous word published in italics] democratization." And, as a friend of our country, which she emphasized several times, she left the following message for the citizens of Slovakia: "It is very important that Slovaks not yield to the misconception that they are not understood by others."

Slovakia: Yeltsin Victory, Factors for Concern Considered

AU0907110996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Jul 96 p 9

[Commentary by Blazej Panik: "Victory Is in the Bag and a New Duel Is Beginning in the Kremlin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite all the concern, Russia has come through the first ever—in essence, problem

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free—election of a head of state in its centuries-long history. Despite all the difficulties of the transformation process, the will of the majority of voters rejected returning to the methods of the communist past and gave priority to continuing along the current reform path, of course, in the belief that it will no longer be so thorny.

This is extremely positive. No less important is the fact that the vanquished has accepted his defeat and congratulated the victor.

It is necessary to state right at the beginning, however, that Boris Yeltsin simply could not lose the presidential elections. Namely, his opponent, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennadiy Zyuganov, had been reduced by the continuous propaganda campaign of the electronic media and all state structures to a role of such great evil as compared to any other alternative that Yeltsin must have seemed better to the majority of vacillating voters. The golden rivet of television's totally one-sided orientation was the main evening news program on the first channel (ORT) on the day of the elections, in which the viewers could see how (the somewhat indisposed) Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and the new influential man in the Kremlin, Aleksandr Lebed, cast their votes; there was not even a fleeting glimpse of the person who was competing with the president in the crucial second round of the elections. Only Brezhnevite agitators would not have been ashamed of something like this.

In the given context, therefore, it is too much to discuss the correctness of the election campaign; the candidates' equal chances of gaining access to electronic media; and, thus, the fair conditions for the free democratic elections. If, despite this, such assessments of the presidential elections in Russia appear in official reactions from abroad, including the West, this is more a sign of profound relief that the elections took place at all, did so without any serious accompanying excesses or unrest, and that they were won by the "old, known" and "scrutable" Boris Yeltsin. In other words, the important stage of development that Russia—as a significant Euro-Asian power—now finds itself in should not be forgotten. In this situation, its predictability and a certain, necessary level of political stability as a precondition to gradually removing the sharp socioeconomic edges within the country are important for its neighbors, partners, and rivals.

It is almost certain that, face to face with a possible victory by the Communist candidate Zyuganov, Yeltsin received carte blanche from Western statesmen allowing a certain tolerable depth to the gashes on the democratic facade of the presidential elections. In view of the doubts that have arisen again recently with a new intensity in connection with his state of health, however, even his reelection will not alleviate the concerns from abroad about Russian uncertainty. These concerns—apart from the ambiguity regarding Yeltsin's actual physical condition—involve three major factors.

The first is the upcoming inevitable clash between the president and the State Duma during the approval of the candidacy of the prime minister and, de facto, of the whole government as well. Without the votes of the Communists and their ideological allies in the current Duma, it will be hard to push through any more consequential decisions. There is, however, room here for tactical "political bargaining" maneuvers that Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin may pull off.

The second factor of concern over possible destabilizing postelection issues is already more serious: the economy or, rather, finance. The state, the army, a considerable majority of businesses and their employees, education, and health care are strapped for cash. Salaries and pensions, despite promises, are still not being paid regularly. There is nothing from which to pay them. If tax discipline does not improve radically and the government does not manage to maintain an acceptable level of inflation, serious, negative signals may start manifesting themselves as early as the fall. This will happen whether or not there are also communists in the new Russian cabinet.

And, finally, the third factor of postelection Russian uncertainty is the conflict now festering within the Kremlin's corridors. Its central figure is—and will only be even more—the new influential man on Moscow's power-wielding Olympus, Aleksandr Lebed. It had only just become clear that Yeltsin had emerged from the decisive second round of the elections as the clear winner—by the way, thanks considerably to the fact that he had offered Lebed senior posts in the Kremlin immediately after the first round—when certain of the president's closest aides "suggested" to this former general that he not attempt to aim too high and that he simply forget about the post of vice president. For example, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also expressed himself in this manner and did so in a way that could have given Lebed the feeling that they needed him only for Yeltsin's victory over Zyuganov. This had even been achieved more easily than expected.

It will be much harder to share the spoils of victory among the individual political power-wielding and financial elite struggling with all possible and impossible means to influence the president. And, this duel, maybe as important as the elections themselves, is only just beginning in Moscow.

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Slovakia: Politicians View Russian Elections, Future Relations

AU0907090896 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Jul 96 p 6

[Article by Jana Pankovcinova: "Slovak Politicians Hope for Change in Russia's Negative Attitude Toward NATO Enlargement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The outcome of the presidential elections in the Russian Federation did not surprise Peter Weiss, Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] deputy chairman for foreign relations. In an interview for SME, Weiss stressed that Yeltsin's victory establishes prerequisites for continuity in relations between the Russian Federation and the Slovak Republic. He expressed the hope that the end of the election campaign in Russia would make Russian politicians tone down their rhetoric and become more pragmatic. Weiss is confident that the Russian side will approach without prejudice also the issue of NATO's enlargement to include central and east European states and that "it will correctly understand the interest of the Slovak Republic in being in the zone of stability, prosperity, and security, and its interest in seeing this zone expand as far as possible to the east." Asked whether this hope is realistic, given General Lebed's critical statements on NATO's enlargement and speculations that Yeltsin may not endure in office until the end of his term, Weiss said: "The elections have brought a new balance of political forces on the Russian political scene. There is not just the phenomenon of General Lebed but also the much stronger position of the Communist Party and the marginalization of other political parties. A positive factor is that Zhirinovskiy, a politician who made people's flesh creep, has been marginalized. I proceed from the premise that, if the Russian Federation will want to solve its immense economic and other problems, it will not be able to implement a policy from the position of strength and ignore the security and political interests of neighbors to the west of its borders. It will also be important for Slovak politicians to communicate with the appropriate structures in Russia and to maintain strong nerves even when some politicians in the Russian Federation possibly raise their voice." Democratic Union Deputy Eduard Kukan, former minister of foreign affairs, told SME that Yeltsin's victory means for the Slovak Republic the continuation of existing relations. "This is a critical comment," he added. According to him, the election result could contribute to alleviating Russia's position regarding NATO expansion issues and an agreement between NATO and the Russian Federation because the election campaign, in which expedient slogans tend to be used, is over. Concerning speculations that Yeltsin may not hold out until the end of the electoral term, Kukan said: "We have to wait and see. Should Lebed become president, the situation could change, but I do not want to speculate too much." Irena Belohorska, member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Foreign Affairs Committee for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], confirmed that the election results would mean the continuation of existing relations between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation. "The other alternative (Zyuganov—editor's note) could have been a big unknown, as it were," she added. Jan Langos, chairman of the Democratic Party, said that, for the Slovak Republic, "it will primarily be important how Vladimir Meciar's government will behave—whether it will yield to Russian interests in the Slovak Republic, or will manage to resist them." Christian Democratic Movement Deputy Chairman Frantisek Miklosko said that Yeltsin's victory is important for the continuation of the struggle, in which "70 years of communism have to be transformed into a market economy and the country given a new vision, one that will not be based on the external and internal enemy."

Slovakia: Comment: Yeltsin Election Did Not End Battle for Kremlin

AU0907113896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 6 Jul 96 p 20

[Commentary by Ivan Drabek: "Defeat for Yesterday"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The biggest sensation of the presidential elections in Russia is the winner's relatively large lead over the loser (roughly 13 percent). Hardly anyone expected the voters' turnout to be so high and the dominance of the acting president to be so overwhelming. At the moment it is not so important whether this outcome was determined by the instinct of free people to choose in free elections the alternative that, according to their conviction, can give them more freedom, or whether the fateful choice was assisted by various manipulative techniques. What matters most is that the illusions about the possibility of returning to the bright yesterdays, which could have thrown the biggest republic of the former Soviet Union into an even bigger chaos than the one in which it finds itself today, seem to have suffered a final defeat. This is surely good news for the world, which fears nothing more in relation to Russia than its instability.

The 10 million votes separating Yeltsin from Zyuganov are a sufficiently large distance for the decision of the majority not to be called in question by anyone. This has been acknowledged even by the Communists, who have become reconciled to their historic defeat in an unexpectedly peaceful manner.

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The reply to the question about the loser in these elections is simple. Determining who won is more difficult. A typical feature of the Russian presidential elections was that the majority was voting not for, but against something. Zyuganov's voters, first and foremost, against the social burden of the reforms, Yeltsin's electorate against the possibility of a historic revenge. In the end, the protest against the not so distant past turned out to be stronger than objections to Yeltsin's mistakes and the high price of economic changes.

For the majority of voters, this conflict between two directions of development was more important than the presidential candidates who personified it. How else can one explain the fact that even the rumors about the grievous state of health of the 65-year-old acting president, which have not been credibly refuted by anyone, could not endanger his victory. Moscow analysts claim that, even if voters had discovered Wednesday [3 July] morning that Yeltsin was just a myth, and not a really existing person, this would have had no major impact on the outcome of the elections.

However, Yeltsin's state of health could soon become one of the key factors of further developments in Russia. The fact that, in order to win, Yeltsin had to make use of Lebed's faction, makes the situation all the more dramatic. The very presence of General Lebed, a nonstandard figure for the Kremlin, upsets the fragile balance of forces within the Moscow power elite.

The third round of the battle for the Kremlin—from which the public will this time be excluded—will most probably take place precisely between the ambitious charismatic general and Yeltsin's present, far from united, team. The elections are over. From now on, the battle for the Kremlin will take place within its walls.

Slovakia: SDL's Migas Looks Back on Coalition Crisis

AU0807161696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 2 Jul 96 p 5

[Interview with SDL Chairman Jozef Migas by Julius Gembicky; place and date not given: "Jozef Migas: My Creed Is Not To Set Out on Political Adventures; With SDL Chairman Jozef Migas About the Coalition Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the turmoil of the 10-day coalition crisis, the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] and Jozef Migas, its recently elected chairman, became what were perhaps the most unknown quantities of the movements on the chessboard of Slovak politics. Only a few days before the coalition crisis erupted, Jozef Migas unpacked his diplomatic bag from Kiev and, within a few days, the events of the intricate political conflict threw him into the very center of the stormy developments—from the viewpoint of both the government coalition and the opposition. Our interview with the SDL chairman is an attempt at a look into the rear mirror of those events.

[Gembicky] Mr. Chairman, the fourth SDL congress in Nitra [on 27-28 April] adopted the strategy of the SDL's independent course of action in the opposition camp. Despite your unwillingness to enter into the present government coalition, by proclaiming this policy you sent two important signals to the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. The first was that the opposition spectrum is not a monolithic whole. And second, by its autonomous position, the SDL created scope, until the end of the electoral term, for bridging possible crisis situations not only within the coalition, but also between the coalition and the opposition. What are the contents and the political intention of this SDL idea?

[Migas] Everyone who takes more than a superficial interest in politics knows that the situation in Slovakia is a peculiar one. The government coalition is made up of quite diverse parties. It happens, mostly under HZDS influence, that the government coalition makes decisions that have, at one time, a right-wing character and, at other times, a left-wing character. If the SDL practiced a simple rejectionist policy in this situation, it would have to reject even those steps of the government coalition that bear the stamp of left-wing policy. If the SDL formed a monolithic opposition whole, as you call it, how would it differ from the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], for example? Only in name? Even among the opposition parties there are differences. We are able to agree with them in specific situations, but we do not deny them their right to their own independent policy. But, by the same token, we do not intend to ask for anyone's kind agreement that we, too, be allowed to pursue an independent policy. The SDL is an ambitious opposition party that offers socially oriented people its own left-wing policy.

[Gembicky] What, in particular, has the government coalition not fulfilled?

[Migas] To put it bluntly, it has thwarted parliamentary control over executive power. After that famous parliamentary night of November 1994, which was initiated by the HZDS and supported by the votes of the Slovak National Party [SNS] and Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS],the opposition was deprived of the possibility to exercise control. Executive power came to be controlled by its own people. And it seems that nothing major would have changed in this regard, had the government coalition not become embroiled in an ar-

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gument over privatization. The SDL will vigorously enforce control of privatization and the opposition's representation in National Property Fund [FNM] bodies. We will also support the expansion of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] OKO [Special Supervisory Body, overseeing the secret services] to include another opposition representative. Similarly, we will be pushing for the representation of the opposition in the Supreme Inspection Office [NKU] and in the councils supervising the electronic media.

[Gembicky] Mr. Chairman, many of the principles that you have mentioned are also acceptable to the other opposition parties. They, too, demand effective control of government policy and participation in this control. Why, then, did you decide to go it alone? Moreover, do you really think that the conditions for your tacit support for the HZDS and Vladimir Meciar's government would be acceptable to them?

[Migas] There have been situations when, in defiance of prior agreements within the opposition, the SDL's interests were not respected. Following such negative experiences, we took our own measures. But, even during the bilateral talks with the HZDS, we were not asserting only our own interests. The HZDS proposed a five-member OKO. They wanted to replace two members who had become inconvenient for them. We did not accept this. We insisted that the OKO be expanded by two new members from opposition ranks. And that is how we then voted in parliament. So far, we have managed to push our representative Viliam Sopko onto the OKO. The fact that he succeeded means that he was acceptable. If the other opposition parties did not hold talks with the coalition about their candidates, they should draw conclusions from it, instead of taking umbrage.

[Gembicky] The opposition parties claim, however, that the SDL violated an agreement because, originally, it was not interested in being represented on the OKO, but gave priority to participation in FNM bodies.

[Migas] That is not true. We did not violate any agreement. Only after the 16th NRSR meeting started did Democratic Union [DU] and KDH representatives start approaching other SDL functionaries. They merely informed our functionaries that there were many bodies that ought to be reconstructed and that, because we attribute particular importance to the FNM, we should not nominate our own candidate for the OKO. The Common Choice [SV] has the second strongest parliamentary club after the HZDS club, which is why we did not accept this proposal of the right-wing opposition parties. The resolutions of the SDL Republican Council are binding on me and they clearly state that one of the tasks of the SDL leadership is to push its representative onto the OKO.

[Gembicky] Nonetheless, do you not consider it a mistake, now that several days have elapsed since last Friday, that the proposal to elect the KDH's Ladislav Pittner onto the OKO was voted down in parliament?

[Migas] It is scarcely possible to blame only the SDL for Ladislav Pittner's and Bela Bugar's nonacceptance. It was a secret ballot and I know that agreements were being concluded in this matter not only at the level of the opposition, but also with the ZRS and SNS and even with some HZDS deputies. It seems that people who initially declared support for them did not vote for them in the end. The deputies in question from the KDH, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, the ZRS, and the SNS should therefore perhaps do some soul-searching as well.

[Gembicky] Your statement at the May Day rally that it might be necessary to dust off Marx's works stowed away in the attics has reinforced in the opposition camp the suspicion that your election as party chairman might be the fulfillment of Vladimir Meciar's prophecy about "mending" the SDL leadership and the harbinger of a possible change in the makeup of the present government coalition. There has even been talk about your exceptionally good relations and your accommodating attitude toward the prime minister. How would you refute this suspicion as convincingly as possible?

[Migas] The talk about my alleged penchant for the prime minister reminds me of the prompt reaction by one press secretary to a similar rumor. When a journalist asked this press secretary whether it was true that his chief, a high-ranking politician, had been given a good thrashing by his wife the day before, he replied approximately as follows: Yes, but that was not everything. She also hit him with a meat mallet on the head and the two of us then buried him in the garden. Let me point out that I reached my present position by democratic means. I was elected to it at the SDL congress. At this same congress, the delegates decided that the SDL would not enter into Meciar's present government. It is my duty to respect this decision. And I do not respect it just because I have to, but because it is also my conviction that those decisions of the congress and the resolutions of the SDL Republican Council are correct. There is no shortage of speculation in politics. It is within such a context, and with a large pinch of salt, that one should also perceive the misinterpretations of my statement about dusting off Marx's works in the attics. I only mentioned that a new layer of the noveau riche was emerging on the basis of speculative privatization and unlawful appropriation and that Karl

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Marx had already spoken about such phenomena in Das Kapital a century ago. [Gembicky] Mr. Migas, does the fact that you have been critical of the former SDL leadership encourage these views? Are you concerned that the SV club will also collapse in the near future because of the difference of opinion with the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia on current events in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR]?

[Migas] We have made it unequivocally clear in the party leadership that, in the past, the issue of the SDL's attitude toward the workers was not dealt with. This was a politic[illegible] mistake. Confirmation of this is the fact that a deputy for two electoral terms, Jan Luptak, broke away from the SDL and established the Association of Workers of Slovakia. Because we did not deal with workers' policy, we lost strength. This is an undeniable fact. I was merely open about it and apologized for this mistake. I do not want to criticize the former SDL leadership, but our party failed in this respect, because working people must not be lost from the sight of the interests of a left-wing party. Despite this, I think that a typically monochromatic workers' party does not have any long-term prospects.

[Gembicky] A great deal has also been said recently about a possible split within the SDL itself. Do you acknowledge such a possibility?

[Migas] I do not. Although someone has forced us artificially into the situation whereby only two options are left to us: Either to take part in the privatization coup and the formation of a kind of caretaker government or to take a serious stance toward the accumulated issues and insist on matters of principle, such as supervision of privatization and opposition representation in all of the NRSR's bodies. In defending these principles, I see no reason for us to part ways within the framework of the SV, even less within the SDL. If we have different views on certain partial issues within the SDL leadership, we are unanimous in this. So, fortunately, we do not have to get a headache because someone sees two wings within the leadership of our party. In time, those who constantly predict a split among our ranks will also realize that it is best not to launch into unplanned political adventures, but to let the current ruling coalition govern until the end of its term of office and then in the elections, in a fair competition with the others, submit an account of its government to the citizens. This is in our interest and in the primary interest of this state. And, naturally, it is in our intrinsic interest for our opposition coalition within the SV to hold together until then. I also think that it is unwise to break up the SV club from the point of view of the planned new rules of procedure for the NRSR.

[Gembicky] Following the coalition war over Slovenska Pojistovna [Slovak Insurance Company], when, through the endeavors of the SNS and ZRS, the HZDS was also in danger of losing the fruits of the parliamentary night of 3-4 November 1994, the SDL came to the aid of the weakened HZDS with an offer of tacit support for a minority government led by Meciar and twice in a row gave it a rest in the NRSR from the possibility of the supervisory bodies also being filled by opposition representatives. The principles of political tactics almost emphasize that, at the most opportune moment, it is necessary to take advantage of a political rival's weaknesses and fill supervisory posts with one's own representatives and then sit down at the negotiating table and discuss under which strictly fixed conditions there would be a willingness to sell one's tacit support to Meciar's minority cabinet. There is a suspicion that, for so far clandestine reasons, the SDL is giving the HZDS and Meciar time for political convalescence. Has the SDL fluffed its chance with its delaying tactics?

[Migas] When the crisis in the ruling coalition erupted, we assessed the possibilities for future development. We knew that the SDL would not enter the government. We came to the conclusion that elections, which could have been called quickly, would also not solve anything. A new coalition, a mixture of several different parties, or a caretaker government would also, in our opinion, not be a solution. One option remained, not out of love for the HZDS, but after weighing up the situation: the continuation of the current coalition. It is now up to the parties in the current coalition to reach an agreement, to get on with the government. If not, then it is highly likely—and now I am stating my opinion—that the most viable solution will be early elections. Thus, at the same time, I am giving a clear response to the speculation about whether there have been any secret agreements or whether the SDL has some sort of obligation toward the HZDS. The SDL has no secret agreements with or obligations toward the HZDS.

[Gembicky] SDL Deputy Chairman Robert Fico even said, in this sense, that last Friday [30 June] the SDL prevented the scenario for the government's fall that had been written by the parties with an interest in the privatization of the banking institutions. Obviously, he meant the SNS and ZRS in cooperation with some of the right-wing parties. He even admitted that some opposition parties wanted to resolve the government crisis by forming a caretaker government, which was, according to the SDL, naive. Who, in your view, put forward such a scenario and why is it unacceptable to the SDL?

[Migas] I do not know if it is correct to talk about preventing the fall of the government. I do know,

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however, that certain representatives and deputies from the SNS and ZRS held talks with the right-wing oriented parties and that ideas were expressed about a caretaker government. However, it would be complicated to attempt to show who talked about this with whom, when, and where. From the point of view of the SDL's interests, however, this whole process was reminiscent not of the "about us" procedure, but rather of the "without us" procedure.

[Gembicky] Your view on the status of President Michal Kovac was not among the generally declared conditions of the SDL's possible tacit support for Meciar's minority government.

[Migas] The constant disparagement of the function of the president of the republic also disparages the actual office. The natural dignity of a nation or a citizen, as well as the natural pride that our citizens associate traditionally with the office of president, are offended by this approach. When disgrace is brought upon the president, a citizen feels himself to be disgraced and deceived.

[Gembicky] Prime Minister Meciar is demonized relatively often. In your opinion, who is the source of the domestic political tension in Slovakia?

[Migas] I have worked abroad. It is hard for diplomats to explain the breakneck nature of our developments and the attitude toward constitutional officials. Meciar, and also other leaders of political parties, should realize that politics is not conducted by breaking the knuckles of your political rivals or by trying to eliminate one another. This could lead us into a situation in which Slovakia really will cease to figure among the realistic candidates for entry into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Prime Minister Meciar, SNS Chairman Jan Slota, and ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak should also be aware of their share of the responsibility for what they did after the elections and for what they have caused by their lack of communication with the opposition.

[Gembicky] But, many people regard you as a covert Meciarite, Mr. Migas. What kind of evaluation calling card would you issue for Prime Minister Meciar?

[Migas] I think that the prime minister is a longer-term phenomenon of Slovak politics. His grouping has won elections three times and he has promoted himself as a politician. He has great drive and he knows how to appeal to the citizens. We others have to think about why we cannot do this. His contradictory nature consists of the fact that he manages to win elections, but then has problems with governing and sharing power sensibly.

Slovakia: Disagreements in Common Choice Profiled

AU0507123696

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 3 July publish items on disagreements within the parliamentary club of the Common Choice—a coalition comprising the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS], Green Party in Slovakia [SZS], and Farmers Movement [HP]—over SDL's recent support in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and on the SDL's small coalition partners' dissatisfaction with their role as "extras" within the Common Choice.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 3 July on pages 1 and 4 carries a 1,400-word interview with SDSS Chairman Jaroslav Volf by Martin Krno entitled "Interruption of the Meeting Helped the Coalition." The place and date of the interview are not given.

The SDSS chairman is first asked about the division within the Common Choice parliamentary club that surfaced in parliament on 25 June when the SDL voted with the HZDS to adjourn the NRSR meeting and thus put off planned personnel changes in the National Property Fund [FNM] and the prepared expansion of the special parliamentary watchdog [OKO] over the secret service and other parliamentary control bodies to include members of the opposition. The interviewer points out that "it happens rarely that deputies for individual Common Choice parties vote in a contrary manner" and wonders why this happened "on an issue of such importance as the interruption of the parliament meeting." Volf replies: "In the course of last week, the chance arose to do something in the interest of Slovakia and its citizens, to change the undemocratic methods of government through the reconstruction of control bodies. Everyone knew about the proposals that were part of the conditions, under which the SDL and the SDSS wanted to support a possible minority government. This is why we did not consider it logical not to take advantage of this situation and not to take a vote in parliament that could stabilize the situation. The meeting's adjournment created scope for the coalition around the HZDS to come together again." Wolf disagrees with the view of SDL deputies that the adjournment of parliament averted a "political crisis," arguing that, quite the contrary, "there was a chance to stabilize the situation in Slovakia, a chance that was wasted by the attitude of those deputies who voted for the meeting to be interrupted."

The SDSS chairman is also asked whether the "different views on the solution of the political crisis" within the Common Choice would "accelerate the decision to split

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the Common Choice into two parliamentary entities—an SDL parliamentary club and an SDSS, SZS, and HP club." Volf replies: "I do not advocate a split because of the failure to agree on certain issues. I want the Common Choice club to be preserved, but I want somewhat different rules to begin to rule there. The SDL cannot confront us with faits accompli. We, the smaller parties, cannot just play the role of extras. A split is not on the agenda, for the time being, provided, of course, that no significant change occurs in the policy of our partners, particularly the strongest one. Our task should be to expand the social democratic space in parliament, rather than to split it up."

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 3 July on page 2, under the headline "The Common Choice Is Not Falling Apart Yet," carries a 200-word report by "mrs" on a meeting of the chairmen of the four political parties making up the Common Choice. The meeting, held in the NRSR on 2 July, reportedly "evaluated postelection cooperation within the framework of the Common Choice heretofore." The report states: "The discussion centered on problems that have arisen within the coalition and on the possibility of two parliamentary clubs being set up. The four chairmen agreed that individual Common Choice entities will draw up comments on the statutes of the Common Choice parliamentary club, which will be amended in a certain way so as to improve cooperation and communication and to make the three smaller parties more visible. SZS Chairman Jozef Pokorny told SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in this context: 'We were exploring mechanisms that would make the statutes reflect the existence of two clubs. We did not part company on the understanding that the Common Choice is falling apart. The process of setting up a new club was postponed until the fall. The establishment of a new club is realistic, in my opinion, and, as far as our party is concerned, it would be a contribution.'"

Slovakia: Poll: Kovac Trusted More Than Parliament, Government

AU0807183296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Jul 96 p 1

[Report by "(r)": "FOCUS: The President Is Trusted by 47.8 Percent, Parliament by 39.4 Percent, and the Government by 34.2 Percent of Respondents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The FOCUS agency carried out a public opinion poll between 12 and 18 June 1996, in which the respondents were asked to express their degree of confidence in three institutions. There were 973 respondents in the representative sample. The results are contained in the following table.

Do you trust the following institutions?

	President	Parliament	Government
	Percent		
Definitely yes	16.7	5.8	8.8
Rather yes than no	31.1	33.6	25.4
Rather no than yes	26.6	37.1	33.9
Definitely no	18.6	13.4	23.5
Do not know	7.0	10.1	8.5

Slovakia: Deputy Speaker Discusses Hungarian Autonomy Appeals

LD0807145296 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of twelve organizations of Hungarians living abroad met at a conference entitled "Hungary and Extraterritorial Hungarians." The purpose of the conference, which was held last week [in Budapest], was to coordinate Hungarian diplomacy's priorities with the policy pursued by Hungarian organizations outside Hungary. The communique adopted at the end of the conference also included a specific reference to autonomy. In this context our correspondent Bernard Hornak asked Slovak Deputy Speaker Augustin Marian Huska about his assessment of the conference:

[Begin recording] [Huska] The fact alone that they organized such a conference does not worry us too much. But the communique adopted at the end of it constitutes a serious issue and we have to treat it accordingly. It amounts to an appeal for autonomy for the Hungarian-speaking populations in neighboring countries, as well as to an expression of the [Hungarian] government's support for the recommendation to set up an autonomy council.

I think that because of this the communique clearly violates the principles the Hungarians themselves have internationally pledged to respect when they issued a statement that they would not support irredentist, separatist, and similar tendencies. We believe that the matter concerns all neighboring countries and therefore we take the communique quite seriously.

I believe that all the neighboring countries must now consider the most appropriate ways of responding to similar initiatives in the future. If what we have here is called a Hungarian offensive, then I think all of

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Hungary's neighbors must coordinate their response to this offensive.

[Hornak] You know that Hungarian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gabor Szentivanyi described the communique as a balanced document which is well in line with the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty as well as with international norms. On the other hand, Slovak Foreign Ministry State Secretary Jozef Sestak called the communique's reference to autonomy an unfortunate step for creating good neighborly relations and said that, in fact, the communique violates the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty.

[Huska] For our part, we cannot condone anything that compromises the treaty. On the other hand, the Hungarian Government—bending to internal political pressure—made huge concessions at the expense of the principles enshrined in the treaty and even overstepped the agreed framework. All of this confirms that these developments are driven by certain interests which must be opposed and which must not be ignored. Hungary's neighbors cannot be constantly traumatized by developments of this sort.

[Hornak] The Hungarian Foreign Ministry spokesman argued that various forms of autonomy exist in more than a dozen European countries. He also said that the communique should be interpreted as a reflection of the conference's collective thinking and not as a legally binding international document.

[Huska] The only way we can interpret the communique is as yet another move in a preconceived scenario of gradually stepping up the pressure. Such is the intention of certain political forces and the present Hungarian Government has been making concessions to them. Either this is because the government does not know how to handle the pressure, or the government is identifying itself with it. In either case, we must say that we are not going to support these developments and that we will oppose them.

Our view is that such developments amount to interference in the interests of all Hungary's neighbors and therefore it will be necessary for all the neighboring states to consider their future action in thwarting this Hungarian policy. [end recording]

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Hungary: Horn Tells Summit Hungary Ready To Join EU

LD0807142796 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to [Hungarian Prime Minister] Gyula Horn, Hungary has prepared itself in a trustworthy manner for membership in the European Union. Lajos Szelestei reports on the prime minister's comments at the East and Central European summit in Salzburg:

[Szelestei] In his speech at the East-Central European summit in Salzburg, the prime minister stressed that Hungarian macroeconomic indices were close to the European average, be they budget or balance of payment deficits, although Hungary was, as yet, lagging behind in terms of the level of inflation, still too high in Hungary.

He denied that the government's tough economic austerity program was softening, but according to his assessment, possibilities for tightening the screw further no longer existed because although domestic consumption and the level of real wages were still falling, the aim was that in 1998 the population should feel the improvement tangibly. [passage omitted]

Horn also met the Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic [at the East-Central European economic summit in Salzburg] and asked Kontic to help the seven [ethnic] Hungarian territorial autonomies in Vojvodina because these were receiving less and less money from Belgrade.

Horn also raised the idea that Hungary should send experts to the Southern Lands to study the situation of the ethnic Hungarians living there, and the two governments then should decide about future tasks on the basis of the experts' report.

Hungary: UK Foreign Office Minister on Relations

LD0571851 (Internet) FCO On-Line WWW Service in English 5 Jul 96

["Speech By Foreign Office Minister of State, Sir Nicholas Bonsor at the Central European University, Budapest, 4 July 1996: 'Britain and Hungary: Partners In Building Prosperity and Security'"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] I am delighted to be here in Hungary in this anniversary year. I bring with me the warm wishes of the British people for the celebration of the birth of the Hungarian nation. The decision 1100 years ago by Arpad and the 7 Magyar tribes to set up home here in the Carpathian Basin was clearly an inspired one. Your country is rightly famed for what those first Magyars and their descendants have achieved over the centuries. Hungary is a land known throughout the world for the excellence of her music, literature, horsemanship, and wine, and, not least the inventiveness of her people.

Britain is bringing her own contribution to your Millicentenary celebrations. The British Government together with many British companies active in Hungary are supporting a dozen different events. These range from a science and technology exhibition in October through to a visit next week to several Hungarian towns by the Lonach Highlanders—over seventy kilted marchers bearing bagpipes and 3 metre pikes—a terrifying prospect!

An Era of Change in Europe

Europe is going through a period of enormous change and opportunity. The dramatic collapse of communism in 1989 and 1990 has given us the chance to join with Hungary and other partners in building a wider, more secure and richer Europe. The revolutions of seven years ago have allowed the countries of Central Europe once again to take their rightful place among the free states of Europe. We have seen proof that the old roots of democracy in the region have survived the long postwar winter. They tried to grow in Hungary all too briefly in 1956—this year marks the 40th Anniversary of those dramatic events. But since 1989, your democratic roots have produced vigorous and lasting growth. Indeed it is Hungary's and Central Europe's success in establishing pluralist, liberal, democracies and working market economies which gives us the chance to overcome the divisions of the past. Together, we have an unprecedented opportunity to reshape our continent to match the needs of the present and future.

Britain is at the forefront of responding to this opportunity. We are thoroughly engaged in Hungary and Central Europe as a whole. Our Know How Fund has helped build the framework of a modern market economy—for example through support for the Budapest Stock Exchange and in providing advice on the reform of the Hungarian civil service as it prepares for EU membership. Britain is also a major contributor to multilateral assistance from the West. Through the British Council and the BBC World Service, we are promoting one of our greatest cultural assets, the English language, a powerful instrument in helping Central Europeans flourish in an increasingly English speaking world.

We are also here as traders. Britain is a serious commercial partner for you. British exports to Hungary last year were nearly 300 million pounds. Our imports of Hungarian goods were over 370 million pounds: total trade of over 1 billion dollars. Our trade with Central Europe as a whole grew by over a third last year. Direct British investment in Hungary now totals over

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500 million pounds, more than in any other Central European country. But, of course, we need to do more. We are working hard to do so. Major companies such as United Biscuits, BAT and Powergen have already invested in the Hungarian economy and others like National Grid and British Energy are keen to do so. We have also built links in the defence field unimaginable 10 years ago. The UK is a major European player in IFOR, working together with Hungary for peace in Bosnia. Hungarian officers are today training alongside our own senior officers at Staff Colleges in Britain.

Britain's Vision

Britain has two overriding aims as we look east. We want to extend to Central Europe the security and prosperity which Western Europe has enjoyed since the war. And we want security without fear, and without enemies—we want to build a strong relationship not only with Central Europe, but with Russia, Ukraine and other countries which emerged from the Soviet Union. These two aims must be pursued hand-in-hand if we are to make this a continent of lasting peace—an example and exporter of security to other parts of the world.

The post-war security and prosperity of Western Europe were built largely upon the success of two organisations, NATO and what is now the European Union. These institutions, though constructed in the vastly different circumstances of the Cold War, remain the cornerstones of our future peace and wealth. We see their enlargement as a crucial part of our strategy for extending eastwards the benefits enjoyed by the Western half of the continent.

For this reason, Britain has been, and will continue to be a staunch advocate of the enlargement of the EU and NATO. Both the EU and NATO are committed to such a policy: the EU since the Copenhagen European Council in 1993; NATO since its Summit in January 1994. Britain is working enthusiastically and tirelessly to see these commitments become reality.

First, NATO enlargement. It is part of a broader strategy for adapting the Alliance to new political realities and developing its relations with former adversaries. An enlarged NATO will continue to be a purely defensive alliance, also capable of taking on the new challenge of peace-keeping operations even more effectively. Its enlargement is not directed against nor will it threaten anyone. Making Central Europe more secure will strengthen the security of all.

The Partnership for Peace programme, PfP, launched over two years ago, has already proved an important tool for enhancing European security. It has deepened political and military ties between the Defence Ministries and armed forces of NATO and PfP countries. Many partners, including Hungary, are taking part in IFOR in Bosnia, the largest military operation in NATO's history. IFOR is an excellent example of how experience of training together gained through PfP can pay real dividends in a real-life peace keeping operation.

Hungary's contribution to peace in Bosnia—your participation in IFOR; your willingness to allow NATO AWACS flights to overfly, and IFOR troops to be based on your territory—is recognised in Western capitals as a sign of seriousness about joining the Alliance.

The UK's commitment, and that of our Allies, to NATO enlargement is clear. We do not anticipate decisions on who and when this year—but we expect to see progress in the first half of 1997. We shall need to show those countries who do not join NATO initially that the Alliance remains relevant to their security concerns. The UK and other Allies are starting to look at ways to enhance Partnership for Peace so that all Partners can enjoy a strong relationship with the Alliance.

In parallel, the UK continues to support strongly plans to strengthen NATO's relationship with Russia. The countries of Central Europe wishing to join also have a part to play in this task. Russia's contribution to IFOR has been very important in building cooperative links with Moscow. So too are our collective efforts in the OSCE to build a European security model. I am glad to take this opportunity to congratulate Hungary on her exemplary chairmanship of the OSCE last year.

EU Enlargement

The UK is also a firm and long standing supporter of the enlargement of the European Union. Britain has led the way. The Prime Minister said in Bonn as long ago as March 1991—over two years before the EU committed itself to eastern enlargement:

'The ultimate destiny of Eastern Europeans is membership of the Community. I hope Germany, which has particularly strong ties to the East, will join Britain in advocating this course'.

In fact, Britain's credentials as a champion of an open Europe go back a long way. Winston Churchill, speaking in 1947 about European integration, said:

'We seek to exclude no State whose territory lies in Europe and which assures to its people those fundamental personal rights and liberties on which our democratic European civilisation has been created. Some countries will feel able to come into our circle sooner, and others later, according to the circumstances in which they are placed. But they can all be sure that, whenever they are

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able to join, a place and welcome will be waiting for them at the European Council table'.

You may wonder why a country 1,500 kilometers from here should be so enthusiastic. The reason is our strategic goal: enhancing the security and prosperity of all in Europe. EU enlargement will underpin that, not least by supporting the building of modern market economies in Central Europe. It will make the Union more truly European. It will create an enlarged single market to the benefit of all. It will enhance Europe's economic and political weight in the world. Our common fight against contemporary ills such as crossborder pollution, international terrorism, crime and drug trafficking will be strengthened.

Enlargement will also help further to build the sort of Europe for which Britain has long argued: open to the outside world; proud, not shy, of its diversity; flexible and dynamic—a natural home for the liberated countries of Central Europe. I would not be surprised if our vision of a Europe built on nation states found an echo in Hungary and other countries which have only recently thrown off foreign domination.

The UK believes that our common goal of enlargement should be the foundation of the Union's relations with Hungary and other future members. Our top priority must be to seize the opportunities offered by the 'pre-accession' strategy. Britain is also pressing hard, sometimes in the face of tough opposition within the EU, for greater access to EU markets for Central European goods: we shall continue to do so.

EU and Central European ministers are already meeting regularly to discuss and work together across the whole range of the Union's activities. Most recently our Heads of State and Government met in Florence. We have much to learn from each other. The UK is committed to making these discussions as worthwhile and practical as possible. This requires effort from both sides.

Britain for her part will continue to be active in giving substance to these links. Together with Italy, we have carried forward an initiative to strengthen ties between the Associates and EU Member States in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. Much progress has already been made, particularly in strengthening cooperation on issues such as the former Yugoslavia, and nuclear non-proliferation. Our diplomats are now working closely together in international fora such as the United Nations, and in countries throughout the world. The UK will be looking to build upon these achievements. For the Central Europeans this is all excellent preparation for membership!

I occasionally hear complaints that enlargement is moving too slowly. Of course, consolidating Hungary's place in the European democratic family cannot happen quickly enough. But it is vital for your sake as well as ours that your country and the EU are ready for enlargement. I applaud all that you have achieved so far. Hungary is among the vanguard of countries in transition. I know that you are working hard to prepare, adapting your laws and adopting new ones, changing your bureaucracy, and taking tough measures to ensure that Hungary has the stable economic and monetary environment it needs to support EU membership.

I am also encouraged to hear of the thorough and energetic way in which Hungary is answering the Commission's Questionnaire. Your response will form the basis for the Commission's Opinion on your readiness for membership. This will appear shortly after the IGC, as EU leaders reaffirmed recently at their summit in Florence. It will lay the ground for the important decisions on opening accession negotiations. I very much hope that Hungary will be in the first group of candidates negotiating for accession. And I look forward to making progress with these negotiations during the UK Presidency in the first half of 1998.

Meanwhile, I encourage you to press on with the remaining steps in preparation for membership. Britain will strongly support Hungary in your efforts to do this. The same holds true throughout the region. We know the task is tough. Moving along the path to membership will require further steps—sometimes difficult and painful. But rest assured of Britain's support—political, economic, and practical.

Enlargement places important demands not only on those wishing to join, but also on the present members of the EU. The Inter-Governmental Conference is addressing some of the institutional issues related to the effective functioning of an enlarged Union—perhaps with 10 to 15 new members over the coming years. Britain will also continue to argue for the wider reforms—desirable in themselves—that are needed to make enlargement a success. Above all this means reform of the CAin the enlarged Union if left unsolved. Tackling them will require political determination and a continuing commitment to the goal of enlargement. We have both.

Conclusion

Our vision for building a secure and prosperous Europe is clear. Britain is determined to rise to the challenge of making it a reality. I am sure that Hungary and the other Central European countries will also seize the chance to create a Europe free from the divisions under which we have lived for too long.

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Winston Churchill once famously remarked:

'Give us the tools, and we will finish the job'.

I believe that as we stand together facing these challenges, we have both the tools and the determination to succeed.

I began my speech this afternoon by speaking of anniversaries. I would like to end with a reference to two more. I sincerely hope that before too long I will be able to return to Budapest and celebrate with you the first anniversaries of Hungary's joining NATO and the European Union.

Hungary: Government, Hungarians Abroad Issue Communique

LD0507193996 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 5 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The conference on Hungarians beyond the borders has ended with a joint communique. The meeting was attended by opposition and government politicians of Hungary and ethnic Hungarian politicians from abroad. It was said at a news briefing following the conference that not all issues were settled there and agreed on, but the very fact that a Hungarian-Hungarian summit was held at all is important in itself. [passage omitted]

According to Hungarian domestic political opposition representatives, the joint communique is too tactful, quite possibly giving rise to misunderstandings. For example, the clause that Hungarians beyond the borders should have the right of veto over interstate treaties was left out of the document. They also regret that the autonomy council, which was to coordinate future cooperation, was not set up despite the fact that support for ethnic Hungarians' demand for territorial autonomy is one of the unresolved issues. [passage omitted]

However, the participants agreed that Hungary's admission to Europe could benefit everybody. [passage omitted]

The coordination of the diverse interests and scope for maneuver will continue this year in the framework of a similar consultation. The participants hope that until then, the declaration just adopted will guide Hungarian-Hungarian relations, although there is no guarantee for this whatsoever. [passage omitted]

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B-H: Zubak Interviewed on Federation Relations

AU0807131296 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27, 28 Jun 96

[Interview in two installments with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mario Marusic; place and date not given: "They Criticize Government Reconstruction To Hide the Attack on Silajdzic"]

[27 Jun p 3]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marusic] The reconstruction of the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia has caused many loud reactions worldwide. Mr. President, what is your opinion of this reconstruction?

[Zubak] My cabinet has already issued a communique on this, and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] and other political structures of the Bosnian Croats have also reacted. Our decision was completely correct, considering the establishment of the Federation, because we reduced the number of ministries and dismissed a number of officials. Unfortunately, the decision has had inappropriate interpretations in the public, and it was used as an evidence—especially in the Sarajevo media and in certain international structures that do not support us—that the Croats are blocking the process of the establishment of the Federation. The Federation is undoubtedly the cornerstone of peace in these and wider regions, and all international factors are interested in whether and how it will function. Therefore, we must understand and recognize that there is much international criticism about the Federation. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that the formulation of the communique was very clumsy, and everyone seemed to jump at the opportunity. It was a great chance for the Sarajevo media to pull a smoke screen over the events in Cazin, as the international community was putting great pressure on Izetbegovic and the Muslim political leadership in Sarajevo because of those events. The Muslims also had to hide their lack of cooperation on the defense law, as well as Mr. Steiner's report on the situation in Sarajevo and numerous violations of human rights, which—unfortunately—has not been presented to our public to the extent that it should have been.

[Marusic] How could the Croat side make such a clumsy mistake in the formulation at a time when obvious mistakes and obstructions on the part of the Muslims gave them the opportunity to assume the political initiative? Was Zagreb told about the move? What was its reaction?

[Zubak] Zagreb knew about the reconstruction of the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, and they approved of it. They thought it was a good contribution toward establishing the Federation, and toward removing the legal and institutional dualism in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, we did not feel that this needed to be highlighted, especially as the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia had been fully functioning ten days before. Neither the Sarajevo media nor the international community paid special attention to that, because they saw that the process of the establishment of the Federation was in full swing and that a part of duties formerly fulfilled by the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was being transferred to Federal institutions. Now that we have tried to reduce, their protests are loud. We have obviously given ourselves our own goals many times because of such clumsy statements. Also, when it comes to Croatian politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we obviously have many great patriots in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they are incapable of expressing their political attitudes in fine shades. They often make statements that are more emotional than are appropriate to the current political climate. Our political partners do not do this too often—although sometimes they do.

This communique is another result of our insufficient political experience. Such reckless statements have brought us fierce criticism from the international community many times before, although we have been very cooperative lately, and our policy is correct—and we are cautious to endanger neither the interests of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor the requests for the committed and consistent implementation of Washington, Dayton, and all other agreements.

[Marusic] Will the Republic of Croatia be the one to pay for that (clumsily presented) act? Finally, is the reconstruction in accordance with Dayton and regulations about the gradual transfer of legal capacities?

[Zubak] The reconstruction is absolutely in accordance with those. It was not because of our problems and obstructions that we did not reduce the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia earlier—it was because our political partners blocked the process of establishing the institutions of the Federation. The most obvious example of that is the problem with the defense law: All the arrangements and agreements could not help actualize the law and bring it before the Federal Government, let alone before the assembly. All those things show that we are not responsible for blocking the process of the establishment of the Federation and the transfer of capacities from the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia to the Federation—the other side has been causing the problems.

We often find ourselves in the situation that Croatia is threatened to be taken advantage of and used as a means

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of pressure against the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia is often held responsible—unnecessarily—for what goes on in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think it should be finally understood that the Republic of Croatia cannot always be held responsible for everything that happens in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Marusic] So, will there be negative implications for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and how difficult will those be, and is the position of the Croatian side endangered after all that turmoil?

[Zubak] I spoke to the representatives of the international community in Sarajevo after the announcement of the decision about the reconstruction and reduction of the government of the Croat community of Herzeg-Bosnia. I think I succeeded in convincing them, I think they accepted my explanation. We agreed that our action was a step toward the establishment of the Federation, not toward the obstruction. However, they also said it was shocking that we issued a communique so clumsily formulated, a communique that left the impression that we were forming a new government instead of reconstructing, adjusting, and reducing the existing one. I still think we have managed to reduce the pressure, both on us here and on the Republic of Croatia. We also said we would—if this process runs smoothly—soon take new organizational steps in order to prove that the reconstruction of the government was not aimed at blocking Federal institutions, but at contributing to their establishment.

[Marusic] The military part of the Dayton agreement was a success, but there are more and more problems in the implementation of the civilian part. How much do you think has been realized and why?

[Zubak] When it comes to the military part of the Dayton agreement, the overall evaluation is that it has been realized to a good extent. However, there is one issue that is not purely military, but it has been allotted as a task to the IFOR [Implementation Force]—the problem of the demarcation line between entities. We signed the agreement a few days ago, and we managed to agree to a small number of open questions about the line—but many problems have been left unsolved. As we can see, the Dayton agreement has not been realized completely in the military aspect.

Regarding the civil part, the international community has finally realized that the terms they have imposed are very, very short, and that it is almost impossible to do everything scheduled in those short terms—especially when it comes to the return of refugees and displaced persons, the freedom of movement, and the circulation of goods. The elections are a separate problem. The international community will eventually force all three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina to create the minimum conditions for the elections. However, things are moving very slowly, and it will take a long time for all the consequences to disappear and for all the civil issues of the Dayton agreement to be resolved.

[Marusic] It was determined in the Petersberg [Germany] meeting that all the officials who do not obey guidelines and fulfill tasks in the establishment of the Federation would be removed, and you and Mr. Ganic were to see to that. Many things have gone wrong, and nobody has been dismissed.

[Zubak] That part of the Petersberg agreement is political. However, neither Ganic nor I can dismiss, for instance, chairmen of municipal councils—if we did, we would violate the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it would not be a legal state anymore. As you have noticed, the two of us were criticized in the last session of the assembly for not acting to remove those hindering the establishment of the Federation. However, no one asked whether we were allowed to take such action. Can the president of the Federation dismiss a municipal chairman? He cannot. Only the municipal council can do that.

Accordingly, that political attitude should be elaborated institutionally: The necessary regulations and the process of realization of those rights should be determined and verified by the Federal assembly. I could not assume that responsibility without the verification. This way, it all comes down to saying that Dzevad Mlaco refuses to do his job—and I am not capable of dismissing Mlaco, and neither is Ganic.

[Marusic] Did anyone raise the question of the regulations and the verification that would enable you to dismiss uncooperative officials who do not obey the Petersberg agreement?

[Zubak] No. On the contrary, Schwarz-Schilling [not further identified] decided that we should form a body that would perform those tasks, with Ganic and myself as chairmen. However, even on our return from Petersberg I noticed that our representatives (especially Kasim Trnka as a legal expert) were not enthusiastic about that decision, because they considered it to be discrepant with the Constitution. That decision, that document, has never been discussed in the assembly, because the Muslim side does not want it. As to the Croatian side, we might accept a document like that, but we want it to be supported by the assembly. We need to compare it with to the Constitution and see what the exact duties of the president and the vice president of the Federation are. We are held responsible for many things that we have nothing to do with.

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[28 Jun p 3]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Stubbornness of the SDA Might Doom the Arming of the Federal Army

[Marusic] At the recent session of the constituent assembly, the dismissal of the Federation president and vice president was called for. Could you comment on that, and what is the actual background?

[Zubak] Interestingly, that initiative came from a number of opposition parties, and the ultranationalist papers in Sarajevo had announced it much earlier. The very fact that it was announced that the opposition would raise that question is indicative in itself. It confirms the existence of a pact between the opposition and the hardline faction of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]. Where and why did their interests meet?

Much, much before that, there was the view in the SDA's political structures—especially after the Sarajevo agreement was signed—that Ganic was under my influence, that I was imposing political and legal solutions on him, although Ganic was only doing what was determined by the Washington, Dayton, and other agreements.

Ultimately, Ganic never signed an agreement alone in the name of the Muslim side (he always had the services of legal experts, and another Muslim official was cosigning), neither did he sign any of the agreements reached in Dayton—he was not even there. Accordingly, it is utter nonsense to consider him an embodiment of the Muslim nation and interests. He has become a victim of such ideas.

On the other hand, the Muslim side has apparently realized that I am not an ikebana-politician, that they cannot deal with me the way they did some other Croat officials in Sarajevo.

So, they wanted to raise the issue of my and Ganic's dismissal as a package. They could not pick me out as the only target, because it would make too apparent that they were actually against Croats, so they made that smoke screen with Ganic, whom they allegedly held responsible for signing the Sarajevo agreement. The hardline faction of the SDA—lead by Mlaco, Cengic, Latic, and Bicakcic—was particularly insistent on that.

I do not think they will be able to carry out that plan, however, because it requires a consensus, a decision of the Constitutional Court to do that, and they cannot prove that Ganic and I have broken our oath, or that we are inappropriate for our duties. Having realized that, they have gradually transferred the pressure to Prlic. They could not harm me, so now they want to create a schism between Prlic and me. At the same time, the Muslim side wants to prove itself capable of endangering Prlic's mandate.

[Marusic] The Federation still has no flag and no coat of arms, and the defense law just cannot seem to be adopted....

[Zubak] Yes, indeed, we have entered the critical phase in the establishment of the Federation. If we overcome those problems, we will take the decisive step in the establishment of the Federation. The defense law is one of the crucial laws, and the Croat attitude toward it is very clear. I will remind you that the previous government of the Republic and the Federation suggested the law (with two problems remaining unsolved), presented it to the assembly, and the assembly accepted it except for two disputed issues—because the working group set up by the assembly could not reach a consensus on those. Dan Gerwer [name as published; not further identified], as a friend of the Federation, took part in that in the name of the U.S. Administration, but his mediation did not help, so other U.S. officials had to act.

Eventually, Soljic and Cengic signed a part of the disputed issues. The issues that they could not agree on in the last session of the assembly were signed later by Ganic, Sacirbegovic, General Cikotic, and myself. The Muslim side had an open telephone line with Sarajevo, and they were working according to instructions given by Delic and Izetbegovic. Accordingly, they did not sign anything without consulting Sarajevo.

As that is how things really were, and the public has been informed about that—U.S. Secretary of State Christopher can confirm it—we will not give up. We will not even discuss it, despite the attempted changes and repeated failures in Sarajevo. The Americans should prove reliable and stick to their signatures—authorized U.S. officials were cosignatories of those documents. At any rate we will stand our ground. I discussed it with everybody, including the highest officials in Croatia.

Please, do not allow yourself to be pressured, so that you have to put pressure on us and force us to withdraw what we have signed. We have reached the line beyond which we are not willing to go. Izetbegovic and his associates will have to accept that, or there will be no defense law. We will not accept changes of any kind. No defense law means no "Train and Equip" program. That is quite clear.

On the other hand, we know that the attitude of the U.S. public is that U.S. troops will remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the duration of the IFOR mandate, but the moral obligation of the United States is to "train and equip" the Federation Army so that when IFOR

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withdraws it is ready for defense in the event of new hostilities or prolonged aggression. The United States is very interested in the execution of the "Train and Equip" program, and they have also ensured the funds. However, the Muslim political and military leadership has been causing problems.

[Marusic] Were the Croat attitudes accepted in those documents about the problematic issues in the defense law that were signed later?

[Zubak] Even the Dayton agreement spells it out that the two military components are to be integrated a level above corps. The law uses the same definition: There are two military components, the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and they are to be integrated above the mentioned level. Recruits—as signed in Washington—may choose in which of those two military components they want to serve, except when it comes to specialized units and institutions. Reservists also have that option.

[Marusic] The process of resolving an issue that is of great importance for peace in these regions is about to begin: the arbitration over Brcko.

[Zubak] That is a very complicated issue. One of the reasons that certain questions have been reopened is that many things were defined only halfway or not precisely enough—we had to work very quickly in Dayton. We have our interpretation of the Brcko issue, and the Serbs have theirs. The arbitration team, consisting of one representative of the Federation, one of the Serb Republic, and one neutral member, is supposed to take the final decision about Brcko—about the status of the town and its surroundings, not about the corridor. The third member should be elected by Federation and Serb representatives, and if they cannot agree, the third member will be appointed later, after a special procedure.

The Federation's representative is Sadikovic—we agreed that it should be a member of the Muslim nation, with the services of a special team that will include Croat experts. That is all we have arranged so far. Terms will run out soon, and the Serbs have claimed in public that they would not let go of Brcko at any cost. We will see how the situation develops, but—according to my interpretation of that part of the Dayton agreement—the arbitration should bring the final decision.

[Marusic] The elections in Mostar will begin very soon. What is their role in the situation in the Federation, and what can that mean for the peace process in these regions?

[Zubak] The elections in Mostar are very significant, both psychologically and politically. They are certainly a test, and a great number of representatives of the international community will be in Mostar, monitoring the elections. When it comes to our partners, we have been informed that they are not completely satisfied, and certain people will probably try to provoke incidents and—I am afraid—annul the results by staging incidents. That is why it is very important for us to do everything in the western part of Mostar, under the control of the HVO, to see that the elections are lawful.

[Marusic] Mr. President, what will the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina mean: An announcement of final division or a step toward the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina? There are many predictions that national parties will win and—presumably—take the whole thing back to where it started.

[Zubak] National parties are very likely to win. However, it is wrong to hold national parties responsible for the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was caused by the nationalism and chauvinism that appeared in the party that controlled the political situation in the entire former Yugoslavia. The worst kind of chauvinism—Great Serbian chauvinism—appeared in the party that controlled the political situation in the whole of former Yugoslavia. It also appeared in the League of Communists.

As the League of Communists was not strong enough to block the process of establishment of Great Serbia and Serbian hegemony, national parties appeared as a purely defensive mechanism. The SDS [Serb Democratic Party] was nothing but a useful extension of the former League of Communists of Yugoslavia, but we can consider the HDZ and the SDA a defensive national movement.

Now, for the first time, we, the nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, have to arrange our relations, and in such a situation—exclusive national interests being at stake—it is normal for national parties to appear as the representatives of the political will of the Croat, Muslim, and Serb nation. Our relations are not smooth, and it is logical that the national parties will reappear. I think they will remain the representatives of the political will of the three nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a long time—until our relations are finally regulated.

That process will take a long time. You see how long it took in Switzerland and Belgium. It is wrong to compare us, as some people do, with the United States. We can only be compared with Switzerland or Belgium. I think a similar process will take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that our state will be a combination of Switzerland and Belgium, with certain regional characteristics, especially

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when it comes to Muslims and Croats, as we have chosen to live together. The clear political will of the Serbs is to unite with Yugoslavia.

The former Yugoslavia dissolved, and new states were constituted on its territory. Therefore, we cannot deny the Serb Republic the right to do the same, if they do it in a way that is legal in terms of international law. It is difficult to say whether the international community will manage to redirect that process toward reintegration. That process depends on relations in the international community, where there is no consensus on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We, the Croats, have chosen to live with the Muslims. That relation of coexistence is defined in the Constitution of the Federation, but not all issues of our relations have been solved in that document. My personal opinion is that our relations will not develop toward dissolution—the process will resemble the one that took place in Belgium, and joint institutions will exist in the future. However, there will also be a form of national communities aimed at preserving the national, cultural, and other identities.

B-H: Interior Minister Receives Slovene Officials

LD0807185596 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1552 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 Jul (BH PRESS)—Drago Mirosic, ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slavko Debelak, deputy minister of internal affairs of Slovenia, today visited the Interior Ministry of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, where Interior Minister Avdo Hebib and his aides received them. The guests from Slovenia briefed Minister Hebib on reasons for the introduction of visas for Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens, as well as on the new, more liberal system for issuing permits for entry to Slovenia to our citizens. Slavko Debelak expressed his wish to raise the cooperation between the two ministries to a higher level in order to achieve better results in the fight against crime.

Minister Hebib said that the sudden introduction of visas for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina had not met with approval in Bosnia-Herzegovina and expressed the hope that a solution acceptable to both sides would soon be found.

He agreed that the cooperation between the police of both sides should improve, stressing that the Interior Ministry of Slovenia should extend expert and other help to the federal Interior Ministry.

The meeting was also used as an opportunity to exchange views on the return of a large number of Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees currently in Slovenia.

B-H: Croats Say Mujahedin Still Active in Muslim Army

LD0807162896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1020 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kotor-Varos, 8 Jul (SRNA)—According to Rasim Delic, the commander of the Muslim army, the mujahedin military center in the village of Podbrezje has been disbanded and Islamic mercenaries returned to their countries of origin. However, this is a notorious lie, Croat Herzeg-Bosnia radio said this morning.

The radio said that most of the mujahedin had been granted Bosnian citizenship and that they were currently a vital element of the Muslim army, mainly working as military instructors.

"Under the Dayton agreement, the mujahedin military bases should have been disbanded and mercenaries sent back," the radio says and concludes that this violation of the agreement is yet another in a series of Muslim attacks against peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Gen Delic Tells Mostar Brigade of Need for Strong Army

AU0507184896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Jul 96

[Report by Maja Mulenspahic from Mostar on the ceremony marking the 4th anniversary of the formation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's 1st Mostar Brigade and the 3d anniversary of the lifting of the Mostar blockade on 5 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mulenspahic] At the start of today's ceremony the professional soldiers of our army and their guests were briefly addressed by Ferid Spago, commander of the 401st Motorized Brigade, 4th Corps commander Mustafa Polutak, and finally by Army General Rasim Delic, who said the following:

[Delic] I have this to say to you: We intend to solve everything that can be solved politically with full political maturity, alongside, however, a strong army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will give full support to our political and state bodies to persevere in solving all the problems that stand in the way of a united and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina within its international borders.

[Mulenspahic] East Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic, Neretva Canton chairman Fatima Leho, Herzegovina Mufti Hadzi-Seid Efendi Smajkic, and Brigadier

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General Arif Pasalic addressed the ceremony. The ceremony in the (?Mihad Pudo Pujka) barracks ended with a cultural program.

B-H: Muratovic: Muslims Will Not Vote If Karadzic Around

LD0807213296 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As part of their preparations for the September elections, representatives of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Bosnia-Herzegovina have held their convention in Bonn, Germany, where around 500,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are staying at this moment. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic informed the convention about the current political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and problems in the implementation of the Federation in particular. He also spoke about the elimination of Radovan Karadzic from the political scene, and pointed out that the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina would warn the international community that, despite pleas from the Bosnian Government and the SDA, the Bosniak people would not take part in the elections if Karadzic was still around.

However, Muratovic said that the party was preparing for the elections regardless of the diplomatic struggle. He said that all voters should do everything to allow the elections to take place within the envisaged deadlines.

Commenting on preparations for elections in Bonn, Dr. Muratovic said:

[Begin Muratovic recording] In our view, not much has been done. It is almost impossible to organize the elections within the envisaged deadlines unless a large number of people are recruited to help. [end recording] [passage omitted]

B-H: Spain's Aznar Offers Conditional EU Support for Mostar

LD0807144596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar visited Mostar today with Defense Minister Eduardo Serra. He held talks with European administrator Perez Casado and the two mayors, Croat Mijo Brajkovic and Muslim Safet Orucevic. Antun Mrkonjic has a report:

[Begin Mrkonjic recording] Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar congratulated the European administrator and the two mayors on the successful elections and said that the world followed the voting with great interest. Prime Minister Aznar stressed that goodwill was necessary to resolve certain legal issues concerning the elections. This was probably in reference to the situation that has arisen following ombudsman Zepos' annulment of the city electoral commission's decision that the voting in Bonn was irregular.

Jose Maria Aznar said that the support of Spain and the EU now depended on cooperation and the future actions of the local authorities. If they find common ground, support will be forthcoming, the Spanish prime minister added. At the end he said he wanted to come back to Mostar again to see progress made in rebuilding the city.

Mostar Mayor Mijo Brajkovic told the Spanish prime minister about the good relations he had with members of the Spanish battalion serving with IFOR [Implementation Force] and with European administrator Casado. Perez Casado brought his heart as well as his head to Mostar, Mijo Brajkovic said. He added that it was good that the Mostar elections had passed without incident, but warned about the legal uncertainties. The uncertainty will probably last for a little while longer, and I hope we will find a solution, Mayor Brajkovic said in conclusion.

Mayor of eastern Mostar Safet Orucevic briefly stressed that Mostar was at the moment on the brink of reunion.

Martin Gerrod, the chief of the European administration staff, also took part in the talks and expressed his satisfaction with the success of the Mostar elections. He pointed to the fact that the people of Mostar wanted peace and order on voting day.

Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, accompanied by Defense Minister Eduardo Serra, laid wreaths at Espana Square in Mostar. This afternoon he visited members of IFOR's Spanish battalion in Medjugorje. [end recording]

B-H: Justice Minister Comments on Elections

AU0807154496 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jul 96 p 13

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Justice Minister Hilmo Pasic by Milanka Saponja; place and date not given: "Karadzic and Mladic Are an Impediment to the Dayton Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, rules apply that apply nowhere else in the world. All the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina registered in the 1991 census of 1991, plus those who have in the meantime reached voting age, have the right to vote and be elected. They can cast their votes in person or in absentia; they can vote in the place of their current or

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former residence; they can even vote in a place where they wish to settle down.

Representatives of the Bosniak-Croat federation [Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and the Serb Republic have filed numerous complaints regarding the way the elections have been prepared, but the elections have been prepared and the international community has responded with even stronger pressure for them to be held according to schedule.

Hilmo Pasic, minister for justice in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, has given an exclusive interview to NASA BORBA, in which he talks about the elections. This is the first interview that a representative of the Bosnian authorities has given to the media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since the three-year war.

[Saponja] Why did the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation agree to these elections when it is obvious that the preparations for them had not been carried out in the prescribed way?

[Pasic] According to the Dayton agreement, the elections have to be held and have to be held within nine months of the signing of the agreement, which was in Paris on 14 December 1995. That is why the elections have been scheduled for 14 September. An interim election committee has been formed, made up of representatives of the international community, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and the Serb Republic. The committee has established a timetable of activities and now these activities are being carried out in a timely fashion. The rules have been set and the interim voting lists have been prepared and are currently being verified. The register of the political parties has been completed. Technical work is proceeding as planned and the elections can go ahead according to schedule. As far as the conditions set down in the Dayton agreement are concerned, they have not been fulfilled and there are serious problems.

The agreement anticipates freedom of movement, freedom of the press, and the return of refugees to their homes. These things are being carried out consistently on Federation territory because the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and all its legal government bodies are firmly in favor of the elections being held. We are making efforts to create all the necessary conditions for the elections to be held legitimately on Federation territory. There are still certain problems regarding freedom of movement in the [Croat-held] Jajce, Stolac, and Capljina areas, but we hope that they will soon be solved, because pilot projects for the return of refugees have already been drawn up. We think that the citizens will soon be starting to return to their homes. This, unfortunately, is not the situation in the other entity, the Serb Republic. Very little, almost nothing, has been done there to create the conditions for free elections to be held. This is best shown by the latest persecution of the remaining non-Serb population in the Serb Republic and the greatest blow to the international community is the insistence on the candidacy of war criminal Radovan Karadzic. Obviously steps are being taken in the Serb Republic to prevent the elections from being held, so that the current leadership in Pale can remain in power. While Karadzic and Mladic are in power, they can more easily avoid being arrested and handed over to The Hague. Also, as long as these criminals are making the decisions in Pale, the expelled Bosniaks cannot return to their homes. We feel that this is a serious violation of the Dayton agreement. It is significant that the international community does not react to this in the proper way.

[Saponja] Why not?

[Pasic] We have certain statements that Karadzic will not run in the elections because he has been accused of war crimes by the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Personally, I think that the international community should be much more stringent regarding the apprehension of Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, particularly when we have in mind the large presence of IFOR (Implementation Force) troops in Bosnia. Had they been arrested, the situation would certainly be entirely different. However, there is obviously fear that their capture could cause a conflict between the Serb forces and the international troops, which could then spread and rekindle the war.

Nevertheless, the preconditions for the elections are being fulfilled, particularly regarding freedom of movement. The interim election committee hopes that the situation will keep improving steadily up to the elections. There is already a greater personal safety of citizens and their property, as well as freedom of speech, political action, and the media. The refugees are also beginning to return.

[Saponja] How do you view the contribution of the Serb Republic's representatives to the committee for preparing the elections?

[Pasic] On the whole, they are trying to be constructive, but their authority is limited because they have to consult with the leadership in Pale on a lot of things. Their representatives in the committee are Slobodan Kovac and Radivoje Dovnjak. On the whole, both of them do participate in the work of the committee.

[Saponja] How are controls on the regularity of the elections being conceived?

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[Pasic] The interim election committee is regulated by the rules of the election control mechanism. First of all, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and other international organizations will be monitoring the elections. Every party and every candidate is entitled to designate observers, who will be able to follow the entire election process from beginning to end. Reporters and representatives of the media will also have access to the elections.

[Saponja] How will the lists of voters be checked, considering that the majority of voters are not in the place of their previous residence and that some have died or have been killed in the war?

[Pasic] One of the specific features of this year's elections is the notable absence of the voters from their places of residence. The position of Dayton, as well as that of the election committee, is to allow all citizens who lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991, regardless of where they are now, to vote. The Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has made a temporary electoral roll, which has been sent out to all the municipalities and all our diplomatic and consular missions for verification. In this way, all citizens can check whether their names are on the lists. Also, citizens can call attention to names of those who in the meantime have died, have been killed, or are missing, so they can be stricken from the lists.

[Saponja] Does this mean that "dead souls" will not be able to vote?

[Pasic] Measures are being taken to avoid any kind of cheating, such as voting twice, once for themselves, and a second time perhaps for someone who is not living, but whose name is on the list of voters.

[Saponja] How will they check up on voters who have been expelled from various places?

[Pasic] Checks can be carried out in every municipality, no matter where a citizen was in 1991. Therefore, those expelled from northeastern Bosnia, for example, can check the lists to find their names in Sarajevo. In addition, the Statistics Bureau will automatically add the names of all citizens who have reached voting age in the course of this year.

[Saponja] On this matter, do you maintain contacts with the official institutions of the other, Serb, entity?

[Pasic] We have exchanged information with the official institutions of the Serb Republic in connection with the election lists, so that we would have more accurate data and be able to prevent possible problems that might arise in all elections. Therefore, we expect that the election lists will be in order and that they will be sent to each voting station in the planned time.

[Box, p 13]

Forty-Eight Parties Registered

"A total of 48 parties from both entities have registered so far, which is 30 more than in the last elections in 1990, when there were only 18," Pasic said.

"Twenty-nine of these registered parties will take part in the elections for members of the state Presidency, 31 for the assembly, 19 for president of the Serb Republic, 22 for the Serb Republic assembly, 17 for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation assembly, 20 for the canton assemblies, and all 48 for municipal assemblies.

"Twenty-seven independent candidates have been registered, of which one (Vladimir Srebrov), is running for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, two for canton assemblies, and 24 for municipal assemblies."

[Box, p 13]

Fikret Abdic Also in Elections

[Saponja] According to certain information, Fikret Abdic, who is currently residing in Croatia, can also legitimately run in the elections, because he has registered his Democratic National Union in Mostar.

[Pasic] It is true that Abdic has registered his party and that he is entitled to run in the elections, since he has not been accused by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. But nevertheless, the attitude of the official judicial institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina toward Abdic remain unchanged. He is suspected of committing crimes and an investigation is under way against him in the higher court in Bihac. A warrant for his arrest has been put out and the Republic of Croatia has repeatedly been asked to extradite him. I do not believe, however, that Abdic would dare to come to the territory of Velika Kladusa to vote, but he will probably just have a passive right to vote.

B-H: Commentary Recommends Recognition of Border on Drina

AU0807182796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jul 96 p 2

[Commentary by Zoran Pirolic: "Bosnia in the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The European powder keg at the end of the 20th century has fully justified all open and concealed doubts that the Balkans is an unstable region in which the process of creation of new borders has not been completed yet. Nobody can say with certainty

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when or how the process of Balkanization will end, particularly not the foreign ministers who talked last weekend about security in the region and economic ties among the Balkan states.

To say that Bosnia-Herzegovina has never defined its relations toward the Balkans is cynical, because the three nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not even have a common attitude toward their own state. The Bosnian Croats on the territory of the still alive Herzeg-Bosnia hold the same attitude toward Balkan cooperation as Zagreb. Economic links are not excluded, but everything else has been put off for some time in the future. The Bosnian Serbs in the Serb Republic welcome all kinds of links with Christian Orthodox states. Their leaders (and much of the opposition) do not believe that there will be any real stability in the Balkans without the unification of the new Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic. Zoran Djindjic, leader of the Democratic Party in Serbia, took great pains a few evenings ago on Pale television to convince the audience that the Serbs from both banks of the Drina River must unite and establish a joint state.

The attitude of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities in Sarajevo (which, at least formally, are still multiethnic) toward this question is pragmatic. Any sort of cooperation that may help the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders is welcome. In the Balkan region, there are a few proven friends of both this country and its majority people. That is a factor that will influence Bosnia's interest in Balkan cooperation for a long time. As this state is developing relations with Asian, African, and Latin American states, why not the same with its close neighbors with whom it lived for more than 70 years in a joint state? No matter how difficult it is to remove a psychological barrier caused by the knowledge of who launched the aggression against this country, relations ought to be developed with Belgrade as well. Nothing is eternal in this world and the same applies to the current regime in Serbia.

It is of vital importance for Bosnia finally to establish the border on the Drina between the two countries. As Admiral Leighton Smith likes to put it, one day it might be a line that will be linking, rather than dividing people. However, today it ought to be primarily the state border of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same goes for its border with Croatia. Borders must not be any obstacle to normal cooperation. The region of former Yugoslavia today gives an impression of civilizational backwardness, unpassable roads, telecommunications similar to those after World War I, and a Chinese wall in Slovenia. Any revival of the former joint state is impossible and Yugoslavia, the one that used to exist, is dead. For nationalist regimes in the region, however, that fact is a source of inspiration for erecting new Berlin walls.

Just as after any dramatic upheaval in the past and this century, involving collapses of multinational empires or states, new spheres of interest and divisions between international powers are emerging again in the Balkans. It is still not clear which direction these divisions will take, just as it is not clear whether the process of Balkanization, in the sense of the creation of ministates, has definitely come to an end. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman said two days ago before representatives of the Croatian diaspora that the highest office in Bosnia had given him approval to add some parts of this state to Croatia. "You can immediately add western Herzegovina to Croatia, but not central Bosnia," Tudjman quoted the person with whom he talked in Sarajevo. These words, repeated by the Croatian president on several occasions, have never been refuted by Sarajevo.

The idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an alliance of three nation ministates is far from dead. Probably, such a concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be confirmed by the September elections. Such a state is hardly viable as a whole. If Bosnia falls apart, this region will be the epicenter of future quakes, to which it is prone anyway. In Serbia, there is growing support for the idea that Kosovo should be divided and part of it should secede from the new Yugoslav federation. As compensation, Serbia would unite with the Serb Republic. Given such a scenario, the question of a Bosniak ministate remains open, because in that case Herzeg-Bosnia would unite with Croatia. The future of this state is uncertain and it will in many respects substantially influence relations in the Balkans. One of the recipes for the prevention of the worst scenario is constantly to insist on the recognition of the international borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At least two of the three leading national parties are firmly against it, though.

B-H: Arkan Death Squad Reportedly Out To Get Karadzic

AU0907084196 Vienna KURIER in German 9 Jul 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Death Squad Out for Karadzic?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Rumors that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic should fear for his life are currently making the rounds in Austrian security circles. According to the rumors, Serbian President Milosevic has allegedly sent militia leader Arkan and his death squad to Pale, Karadzic's stronghold. However, the squad was presumably surprised by the strong resistance

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of Karadzic's defenders. In the fighting, 17 Arkan militiamen were allegedly killed, and Arkan himself was wounded.

These rumors are also known in Western diplomatic circles in Belgrade, KURIER has learned.

The possible dispatch of a death squad against Karadzic could be linked with the international call for the arrest of the Bosnian Serb. He would seriously incriminate his former political mentor, Serbian President Milosevic, before the Hague tribunal. [passage omitted]

B-H: Arkan Dismisses 'Idle Rumors' of Karadzic Arrest Attempt

AU0907084296 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jul 96 p 3

[Report by "V. Mt.": "Idle Rumors"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Arkan also denied rumors that he had been wounded during the alleged Tigers' operation to arrest Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

"These are idle rumors without any basis whatsoever. Karadzic is an honest and honorable man who is most certainly not a war criminal. Today, when everyone is against him, I stand by him."

B-H: OSCE Official Threatens To Exclude SDS From Elections

LD0807163396 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1430 GMT 8 Jul 96

[Report by Tapio Vestinen in Stockholm]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Increasingly tough measures are being taken to shift Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, accused of war crimes, from power. The person in charge of Bosnia's elections next autumn, organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, threatens that Karadzic's party will be totally excluded from the Bosnian elections unless the party substitutes someone else as chairman. The Bosnian elections have been discussed in Stockholm at the meeting of parliamentary deputies of the OSCE. [passage omitted]

The practical work on behalf of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Bosnia is led by Robert Frowick in close cooperation with Carl Bildt, among others. The main issue at present is the position of Radovan Karadzic, who has been branded a war criminal.

Today Frowick made an appearance here in Stockholm at the meeting of OSCE parliamentary deputies. According to Frowick, Karadzic must relinquish all duties both at the head of the Bosnian Serbs and the nationalist Serb Democratic Party [SDS]. Otherwise, the party headed by Karadzic will be totally excluded from the elections, Frowick thundered.

[Begin Frowick recording, in English] If the SDS just defiantly keeps him in power and attempts to continue in the elections, we will have the prerogative to declare the SDS ineligible, but I hope it doesn't come to that. [end recording]

Karadzic has now given up the duties of president of the Serb Republic, but he still retains the title of president. However, he is sovereign leader of the nationalist SDS party.

If Frowick carries out his threat, the situation during the preparations for elections in Bosnia will be considerably aggravated. Tomorrow, Frowick plans to meet Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Here at the meeting of parliamentary deputies, Frowick's sharp position met with a conflicting response. British MP Michael Jopling, among others, noted in his statement that Frowick's proposal lacks any legal foundation. If Karadzic's party is excluded from the elections, they will turn into a farce, Jopling said. No legal foundation for the decision is needed, it is entirely political, Frowick replied.

The speech by Russia stressed, for its part, that the Karadzic case will in time be investigated at the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague, and the party he heads cannot be excluded from the elections before that.

Here at the parliamentary building in Stockholm, deputies are awaiting the adoption of the final declaration of the Bosnian election debate. Whatever its form, neither the OSCE deputies nor Frowick can decide on such a major issue by themselves. If there is the intention to really exclude Karadzic's party from the elections, it will require international political approval at the highest level.

B-H: Klickovic Criticizes 'Undemocratic' Threats Against SDS

LD0807180696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1659 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 Jul (SRNA)—Serb Republic Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic today described the international community's threats in connection with the participation of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] in the forthcoming elections as undemocratic .

Klickovic rejected all manipulations regarding the possible suspension of the SDS from the September elec-

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tions and said that they were groundless. He said that the Dayton agreement makes a clear distinction between state and party offices.

Commenting on statements by certain OSCE officials who said that "they would reexamine the participation of the SDS in the elections because of its links with Radovan Karadzic," Klickovic said: "This is yet another proof of the international community's plans to push forward something that does not exist in the agreement, but I must tell them that they will achieve nothing. With or without Karadzic, the Serb Republic is full of people like Karadzic," Klickovic said, rejecting the possibility that the Serb Republic could be reintegrated into a unitary state, as the international community insists, even when it has to go against the Dayton agreement.

B-H: Bildt Comments on Threat To Bar SDS From Elections

AU0807184996 Paris AFP in English 1818 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, July 8 (AFP)—The international community's chief mediator in Bosnia, Carl Bildt, said a threat to bar the Bosnian Serb ruling party from forthcoming elections means overturning an existing ruling on the matter.

Earlier on Monday, Robert Frowick, the US diplomat overseeing Bosnia's first post-war national elections, said he was prepared to bar the ruling SDS party of Radovan Karadzic so long as Karadzic remained at its helm.

Bildt, Bosnia's so-called High Representative, said however that a decision on SDS particiaptaion had already been taken. The Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) "decided on June 28 to register the SDS. This (matter) now depends on Mr. Frowick if he wants to change this decision."

Frowick, OSCE head of mission in Bosnia said he was prepared to take such a "risk" to prevent a failure of the electoral process, outlined by the Dayton poeace accord which ended the Bosnian conflict.

The threat, stated Bildt, was not "directed against the SDS itself (but) against Mr. Karadzic."

Under the Dayton accords Karadzic is banned from holding public office or running in the election slated for September 14 on account of his double indictment by The Hague-based war crimes tribunal for crimes against humanity and genocide.

Under pressure from the international community and his backers in Serbia, the rebel leader withdrew his candidacy last week but remains in command of the SDS, the political vehicle behind the Serbs's bloody division of Bosnia during four years of war.

"We want him (Karadzic) to disappear.... Everything that Karadzic does is a problem for me except when he goes to The Hague. If this man had a minimum of decency he should go there and defend himself," Bildt said.

B-H: Serb President To Preside Over New 'Senate'

LD0907122896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1113 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 9 Jul (SRNA)—At today's session in Pale the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic adopted an amendment to the Constitution of the Serb Republic which introduces the Senate as the consultative body of the highest constitutional institutions of the republic.

The amendment provides for the Senate to discuss issues of special significance for the political, national, economic, and cultural development of the Serb Republic and give its opinion to the highest constitutional institutions on issues from their jurisdiction.

The Senate will consist of 55 members nominated by the president of the Republic, and its members will be nominated from among prominent personalities from public, scientific, and cultural life. The members of the Senate will have the same immunity as the assembly deputies.

The president of the republic will convene and preside over sessions of the Senate. This amendment supplements the Constitution articles on the president of the republic.

The deputies adopted the law on the Donja-Gradina memorial center in the municipality of Donja Gradina. The inner protected area covers the area of graves on 117 hectares, while the wider protected area, south and west of the inner area, extends to 818 hectares.

The public company "Donja Gradina memorial center" is founded to look after and manage the memorial center. Its headquarters will be in Kozarska Dubica.

The explanation of the law says that it is being adopted in order to eternally preserve the memories of victims of the Ustashi-Fascist terror who fell in World War II in the killing grounds of the Jasenovac concentration camp.

The republic budget will provide for the salaries of center employees as well as a part of the material expenses of the company.

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The detailed plan of this memorial center will be drafted by the municipality of Kozarska Dubica, in line with the environmental planning regulations.

The people's assembly session is continuting according to the agenda.

B-H: Plavsic Urges Government To Observe Dayton Agreement

LD0807162096 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of the Serb Republic government was held in Pale today. The session was attended by, among others, Dr. Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Serb Republic, who told the government that under Point 3 of Amendment 40 of the constitution of the Serb Republic, she had taken over the functions of the president of the Serb Republic on 30 June. She went on to add:

[Begin Plavsic recording] We must, in this period, add yet another law that needs to be observed. I do not want to go on explaining how this happened. You are all aware of it—it was the Dayton agreement. The Dayton agreement was signed without providing the best solutions for the Serb Republic and our people, but it was the result of a need to compromise. The most important aspect of it is that it has brought about peace. It is nothing new to say that the government and various ministries have been involved in implementing the Dayton agreement, some ministries directly and some indirectly.

When speaking about it, I would like to single out the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons. I wish to appeal to you to respond to my call because it is necessary for someone, for the ministers or their deputies, to respond. We also expect you to let us know as soon as you encounter a problem in implementing the Dayton agreement.

In the same way, I shall contact the international community, Carl Bildt, so that we can agree to work on the basis of certain principles and that the approach is one of goodwill and without unnecessary conflicts.

It is in our interest that the elections take place as soon as possible, that they are held in the most correct way. We shall be ready to have elections even before 14 September, but the agreement has been reached to have them on that day. For our part, we shall do everything to ensure that there are no difficulties, that everything runs smoothly and in a correct way. We, the Serb Democratic Party, as the leading party committed to democracy, have the duty to ensure that the elections are fair and conducted in a democratic way. If, God willing, the elections are completed smoothly, then the international community will recognize our entity, the Serb Republic, all our institutions and state bodies and, in general, everything will be much simpler once the elections are completed. [end recording]

B-H: Serb Official: Brcko Key Issue in Resolving Crisis

LD0707202796 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Vitomir Popovic, the representative of the Serb Republic on the Arbitration Commission for the area around Brcko, said today that a chairman of the Arbitration Council for the disputed section of the border line between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation should be appointed by 14 July. This will be followed by the setting up of the council that will be expected to ensure that all the agreements on the territory are ready by 14 December, Dr. Popovic said, and went on to add that in his view controversy could arise only over the part of the border line that would mean widening the territory in the area of Brcko from the current six to 20 km.

As Dr. Popovic explained, under the Dayton agreement, Muslim towns such as Sarajevo, Zenica, and Gorazde have been given corridors to link them with the Muslim-Croat Federation. By analogy, Brcko should be given the same. Brcko can expand its infrastructure, in other words roads, railway lines and telecommunications only to the south because the Sava River is to the north, Dr. Popovic said. This is one of the key issues in resolving the crisis in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Radio Lists Candidates for Bosnian Serb President

LD0707154596 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to incomplete data yet to be released by the interim election commission, seven candidates have been put forward for president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic in the upcoming elections. Six of them are from the territory of the Serb Republic and one from the Croat-Muslim Federation.

The registered candidates for president of the Serb Republic are:

—Professor Dr. Biljana Plavsic from Sarajevo—Serb Democratic Party;

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—Retd. General Slavko Lisica from Banja Luka—Serb Patriotic Party;

—Predrag Radic—Democratic Patriotic Bloc;

—Zivko Radisic from Banja Luka—Alliance for Peace and Progress;

—Ljiljana-Tina Peric from Bijeljina—Party of Serb Unity; and

—Dr. Dragan Djokanovic from Zvornik—Democratic Party of Federalists.

Abid Djozic from Srebrenica, the seventh candidate for the president of the Serb Republic, was put forward by the Muslim Party of Democratic Action.

The fewest candidates were put forward for member of the joint presidency with the Croat-Muslim entity:

—Momcilo Krajisnik from Sarajevo—Serb Democratic Party;

—Mladen Ivanic from Banja Luka—Alliance for Peace and Progress and Democratic Patriotic Bloc; and

—Milivoje Zaric from Banja Luka—Serb Patriotic Party.

The Croatian Democratic Union, the Liberal Party, the Liberal Bosniak Organization, the Bosnian Party, and the Civic Democratic Party have not put forward candidates in the elections in the Serb Republic. The Party of Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet revealed any names from its lists.

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Croatia: Iranian Ambassador, Economy Minister Hold Talks

LD0807212896 Tehran IRNA in English 2105 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 8, IRNA—Iran's ambassador to Croatia Mohammad-Javad Assayesh in his meeting with Croat Minister of Economy Davor Stern on Monday reviewed topics in relation to a scheduled trilateral commission between Iran, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The Iranian envoy told the Croat official that cooperation between the three countries would help boost the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Croat official, in turn, appreciated Iran's readiness to contribute to rehabilitation projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina with good implications in relations between the three countries.

Croatia: Official Rejects 'Regional Approach,' Reintegration

AU0907111796 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jul 96 p 5

[Interview with Croatian Assistant Foreign Minister Hidajet Biscevic by Darko Djuretek; place and date not given: "Croatia Has Established a New Strategic Balance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of the elections in Mostar, the extension of the EU Administration in that town, the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the implementation of the Dayton agreements, and the difficulties of the implementation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina were the subjects of our interview with Croatian Assistant Foreign Minister Hido [Hidajet] Biscevic.

[Djuretek] What is your opinion of the elections in Mostar? Were the expectations fulfilled, and what have the local Croats won there?

[Biscevic] The elections in Mostar can be given a positive grade on the whole. We can also be satisfied with the political signal that the Mostar elections sent regarding the preparations for the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 14 September. In the next phase it will be important to avoid any kind of political partiality or any euphoria regarding the interpretation of the elections. From the standpoint of the interests of the Croats in Mostar, I think that the elections have yielded a positive result. The elections have made a democratic legitimization of their will possible, and they have enabled us to see, by the example of Mostar, that a real post-Yugoslav model for the organization of the authorities and the arrangement of the national relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Dayton principles in the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina is also possible.

Elimination of Karadzic and Mladic

[Djuretek] The elections in Mostar were the first step toward the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but there are numerous obstacles standing in the way of the implementation of the Dayton agreements and the implementation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Biscevic] There are several difficulties. Some of them are of a conceptual nature and involve aspects of a real possibility of the application of the Dayton model of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole and the reorganization of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a union of two entities. That is necessarily linked to the policy and approach of the international community toward the Serb entity, that is, toward the political and military leadership of that entity.

So, there is the question of the destiny of Karadzic and Mladic. Namely, those questions reflect the real intention of the international community to provide the conditions for the democratic, free, and fair elections in the Serb entity, too. Without such elections, it is hard to expect that this entity can really be returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, then, could really be organized according to the Dayton model. In this regard, the responsibility of the international community is enormous.

Therefore, one should continue to apply pressure and insist on the elimination of Karadzic and Mladic from political life. One should also continue to apply pressure via Belgrade, because it was precisely Belgrade that signed the annex to the Dayton agreement on elections, and it is Belgrade that bears direct responsibility.

[Djuretek] Why is the Federation Defense Law being obstructed?

[Biscevic] Following a completely clear agreement during the Washington meeting of the so-called Federation Forum, following another such firm agreement regarding the Defense Law between President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic in Geneva, and following a firm agreement to finally enter the draft law into procedure in the Constitutional Assembly of the Federation, there is now a direct obstruction by the Bosniak side. This obstruction causes frustrations and reactions on the Croat side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, on the other hand, is frequently transferred into some decisions like that on the reconstruction of the Government of Herzeg-Bosnia. This in turn provides an excuse for international pressure on the Republic of Croatia.

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In brief, you now have a situation in which the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina feels relatively safe politically because there is no international pressure that would disturb the strategic plans regarding the relations between Belgrade and the Serb Republic.

The Bosniak-Muslim side has been trying to realize its national and political objectives by using delaying tactics, counting on the tiredness of the Croat side and some kind of democratic transformation of the Serb side. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina often react to this Bosniak policy and, because of the divided international interests, it is, unfortunately, most often at the expense of Croatia.

Quasi-Civic Principles

[Djuretek] Is the policy of the international community not two-faced—very sensitive to every move made by the Croat side but almost completely insensitive to the obstruction by the Bosniak-Muslim side?

[Biscevic] One can feel it on many levels. That difference in the pressure exerted upon the individual sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflects the different views and interests of international circles regarding a solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The symptoms of a policy aimed at the revision of the Dayton agreement, regarding the triple division of Bosnia-Herzegovina or its unification based upon quasi-civic principles, have already been obvious and clear. It is hard to see anything else in the background except an attempt to compensate for the Greater Serbian strategic losses after Operation Storm.

Simultaneously, we are witnessing the introduction of a global regional approach to the political arena, which is difficult to interpret in any other way but as an attempt at the reintegration of the composite parts of former Yugoslavia. It is completely clear that some political circles have been trying to compensate for the new strategic balance that appeared after Operation Storm by the revision of the Dayton agreement.

[Djuretek] In that regard, is any kind of shift of Croatia toward such an imposed new "compromise" possible?

[Biscevic] No. Croatia cannot accept any kind of compromise that would lead to some kind of new political association, and so on. That does not mean that Croatia wants to oppose the division of the geostrategic area of former Yugoslavia in eastern and western parts. That is not Croatia's policy, nor would it be in Croatia's interests in the long run.

A "Berlin Wall" set in the middle of former Yugoslavia, which would, let us say, run from Baranja to Prevlaka, is not in Croatia's interests. Our interest lies in the normalization of relations with all countries, the strengthening of bilateral relations, and transparency in the region. But Croatia cannot accept being a hostage of either the Bosniak national and political platform or the Serbian neo-Yugoslav calculations.

Compensations for Serbia

[Djuretek] What is your view of the interpretation of the recent letter that President Clinton sent to President Tudjman, particularly the part regarding Herzeg-Bosnia?

[Biscevic] There is no doubt that the United States has a special responsibility and special interest in making sure that the Dayton agreement is implemented thoroughly and consistently. The subjects mentioned in the letters of President Clinton and President Tudjman are, at the moment, the most delicate subjects in the political life of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Certain aspects of those subjects, particularly regarding the Government of Herzeg-Bosnia, have inflicted damage on the Republic of Croatia, having given an excuse to those international factors that have been trying, through a policy of a global regional approach, through conditioning, and by putting the issue of Croatian admission into the Council of Europe aside, to minimize the Croatian position and try to realize the policy of compensation for Serbia.

I would even say that those are questions of the utmost importance, and that, therefore, one should not continue the policy that, at present, has created a vicious circle involving the Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosniaks must place their crucial national decisions in the context of much wider, strategic considerations about the future of this part of Europe. It is, therefore, important to finally establish the Federation as a "building standing on its own." Every delay in solving those questions represents a shackle on Croatia's legs, preventing her from realizing her primary interest in European integration, the Partnership for Peace, and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Connected Vessels

[Djuretek] Does that mean that there is a need to speed up the implementation of the Federation and the dissolution, afterwards, of the organs and institutions of Herzeg-Bosnia?

[Biscevic] It is a political law of connected vessels. The failure to resolve some open questions and the blockade by the Bosniak side have caused, clearly and legitimately, frustrations, fears, and then reactions from the Croat side. So, according to that, one needs a concentrated endeavor—in which Croatia has an

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extremely important role, but which it cannot play it on its own—to solve those questions more quickly, in order to strengthen the Government of the Federation as much as possible so that it can take over, not only the administrative, but also the political authority to organize life and the complete destiny of the Federation.

Personally, I think that we are approaching the decisive moments, and that Croatia has an interest in confirming her responsibility. The sooner Croatia affirms the Federation, the sooner she will remove all neo-Yugoslav pressures. It is the task of the international community, primarily of the United States, to make sure the Bosniaks also understand that.

[Box, p 5]

Compromise Between Realpolitik and Morality

[Djuretek] Of all the obstacles in the path of the realization of Dayton, the question of the return of refugees is particularly important.

[Biscevic] Once again, that question is directly linked to the elections.

[Djuretek] It seems that there is a standstill?

[Biscevic] During the elections in Mostar, at a news conference, I stated that the question of the displaced persons and the return of the refugees and displaced to Bosnia-Herzegovina will have to be solved as a compromise between realpolitik and morality.

Any kind of idealism, that is, any kind of unrealistic approach to that question could dramatically jeopardize the peace process. Croatia is trying to express the utmost readiness to cooperate in the political, consular, juridical, and other aspects. The basic interest is to maintain the peace process and not to allow the the issue of the return to bring about a resumption of tensions, or even war.

[Box, p 5]

When Will Full Authority Be Given to the Inhabitants of Mostar?

[Djuretek] In what form will the EU mandate be prolonged in Mostar?

[Biscevic] It is logical to expect that, because of the delicacy of the relations on the ground, because of the elections throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and because of many broader European interests, the EU mandate will continue in some form. It seems to me that the EU in the coming period, presumably in the next three to six months, will assume an advisory role, concentrate more on the questions of reconstruction and development, and leave the new, legitimately elected bodies of authority in Mostar to administer the municipalities and the town itself.

Croatia: U.S., Croatia Said To Disagree About Herzeg-Bosnia

LD0807122096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1138 GMT 8 Jul 96

[Report by Savo Tomasevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 8 (TANJUG)—U.S. President Bill Clinton called on his Croatian counterpart Franjo Tudjman for an immediate dissolution of the institutions of the Bosnian Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and Tudjman replied that, under the Dayton agreement, this could be done only gradually.

Croatia has been quoting 'friendly and partnership relations with the world's biggest power, the United States' as its 'biggest success,' especially since the international community, from the United Nations to the European Union, started rebuking Zagreb over the violations of human rights, freedom of media, relations with Bosnia and other internal and foreign policy issues.

However, some recent events indicate that Washington has started to show Zagreb that 'partnership' and 'friendship' are not unlimited and unconditional categories and that overseas pressure on Croatia could increase.

One of such indicators, Clinton's latest letter to Tudjman, contains a number of clear requests and messages that clash with the previous communication between Zagreb and Washington.

Some independent Croatian newspapers, primarily the weekly GLOBUS, noticed this and said that Clinton's letter to Tudjman was a 'rude and undiplomatic text.'

The U.S. President expressed concern over the developments in the Muslim-Croat Federation, whose founding he sponsored in March 1994.

Clinton said that Herzeg-Bosnia authorities clashed with the federation and that he expected them to be dissolved at once.

He said that the recent appointment of new Herzeg-Bosnia ministers reduced federation-building efforts, and that the adoption of a Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation's defence law without any delay was especially important.

Herzeg-Bosnia, set up at the beginning of the Bosnian civil war, was the first military and political form of Bosnian Croat organization.

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In April 1993, during the open and fierce Muslim-Croat conflicts, Herzeg-Bosnia was proclaimed a republic and the Herzegovina city of Mostar its capital.

Under the Dayton agreement, the republic was formally dissolved and renamed the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, but on June 15 it formed a government, assuming state attributes again.

Tudjman reminded Clinton that the Dayton agreement envisaged a 'gradual' dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia's structures, parallel with the establishment of federal and cantonal authorities.

Herzeg-Bosnia's institutions will be fully dissolved only at the end of this process, Tudjman said.

Clinton's 'immediately' and Tudjman's 'gradually' and 'only at the end of the process' clearly show their different interpretations of the Dayton agreement, at least regarding the deadline for some important moves in Herzeg-Bosnia.

Croatia: Opposition Questions Zagreb's Sincerity Toward Bosnia

AU0807144096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Jul 96

[Report by Nada al-Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Stipe Mesic and Dobroslav Paraga [leaders of the Croatian Independent Democrats and the Croatian Party of Right-1981, respectively], those who insist on two armies in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also favor the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina must have a single army with a joint command at all levels, and this joint army must have only the insignia of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not, as they said, the insignia of some kind of rebel parastate. Those who do not want to have a joint army do not want the federation.

Mesic even claims it is dangerous to pass a temporary law on defense that would be valid only until the elections, because those who insist on it, according to Mesic, only want to gain time so when the Americans leave next fall, they can resume their efforts toward dividing Bosnia.

Neither the Croatian Independent Democrats nor the Croatian Party of Right-1981 believe in Croatia's sincerity regarding the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They consider the recent election of the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia as confirmation of that. They see this as a direct attack on the Dayton peace agreement.

The letter that Clinton has recently sent to Tudjman, and not to Izetbegovic, shows who is to blame for undermining not only Dayton but all other peace agreements on Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to both Mesic and Paraga, this is sufficient proof to see, as they say, which way the wind is blowing.

Croatia: Displaced Krajina Serbs Condemn Tudjman Statement

LD0907112096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0902 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 Jul (TANJUG)—The Association of Serbs from the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Republic of Croatia, representing hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people, today condemned the statement made by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman that the return of displaced Serbs [to Croatia] is impossible. The association believes that such a statement is another proof that the crimes against Serbs who have remained in Croatia, and the few who have returned, are not accidental as they are being committed with the connivance of the authorities.

"We are especially concerned by the tolerant attitude of the international community, including the UN Security Council, complacently watching the behavior of the Croatian authorities and Tudjman, who are ignoring the obligations under the Dayton agreement and other documents of the international community," the association's statement said.

The association believes that the peace in the region will be under threat until such a time as the international community takes decisive measures and realizes the responsibility of the Croatian president and his aides for the crimes committed against the Serb people. "In the name of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people we demand that the Security Council and all international players—primarily the Governments of Germany and the United States—see the true situation in the area of Croatia, assess the hypocritical statements made by Tudjman and his aides, and adopt decisions that will make possible the respect of human rights in Croatia and create conditions for the return of Serbs to their homes," the statement added.

Croatia: Abuse of State Secrecy Discussed

AU0807115396 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jun 96 p 6

[Commentary by Danko Plevnik: "The Secret of Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Answering questions on the occasion of the draft law on the protection of secrecy

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of information sent by the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration to the first reading, Deputy Ante Djapic said that over the last five years there had not been too much leaking of secret data, and that what "was most important, did not leak out, and that was operations Medak Pocket, Maslenica, Flash, Storm," demanding western standards of protection. His parliamentary colleague, Zlatko Canjuga, on the other hand, thinks that too much confidential data leaked out, and that, since the public is not sufficiently informed about these problems, a discussion about it should be opened in the National Assembly.

These statements provide a sufficient cue for an illustration not only of the attitude of the National Assembly toward the secret service, but of the attitude of the secret service toward the National Assembly, because the National Assembly is considered only as a discussion place about the secrecy law instead of a supreme body responsible for control over the secrets. For it is not questionable whether something should be proclaimed a secret, but who should bear responsibility for failed secret operations, since secrecy does not automatically annul the responsibility itself! From Djapic's statement it is obvious that the National Assembly was not informed about information leaking on the occasion of the beginning of Operation Storm. An hour after this operation started, rebel Serbs already knew about it because the information leaked out somewhere near Osijek. It was considered whether President Tudjman should be informed about it and the whole operation called off or whether the action should be continued as envisaged. It was realized that this discovery would not harm the quality of the structure and preparation of the whole action, so that one proceeded, as the Americans would say, "by the book."

CIA and Congress

The most important type of secret is certainly secret operations, most frequently carried out by the secret services, which are convinced that they are the exclusive service of the executive power. However, after Kennedy's debacle in the Bay of Pigs and an embarrassing echo among the public, habits started to change. While in the Cold War it was normal for intelligence activity to be left to the executive power and president, in the post-Cold War period U.S. Congress demands the same intelligence analyses as the Government, in order to influence foreign policy as efficiently as possible. In the United States, secrecy is mostly associated with foreign policy problems in order to widen the space of decisionmaking about foreign policy, while in Croatia it seems that it turns primarily toward internal policy in order to narrow the space for making decisions about it. However, it being as it is, one does not notice a more explicit will on the part of the National Assembly to assume a much more active position like U.S. Congress, in order to control secret operations, or secret interventions.

Perhaps figures will much better describe this process of widening responsibility for secret actions, than words themselves. From 1964 to 1974 the CIA informed Congress about secret actions in Chile in 22 briefings, while in the period 1987-88 alone, the CIA sent some 5,000 written reports and held several thousand briefings. Moreover, the CIA regularly sends its "newspaper" NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (NID) to eight offices of the Government and Congress, in slang called the "gang of eight," in charge of intelligence questions. It is often the case that congressmen try to pass on some information from the NID to THE NEW YORK TIMES or THE WASHINGTON POST, assessing it as having a more political than intelligence character. In general, one needs a high level of professional expertise on the part of both intelligence analysts and of representatives in order to see the real difference between the intelligence and political elements of some information, since one can manipulate both of them. However, those days are gone when one Dean Rusk, secretary of state to Kennedy and Johnson was not allowed to see the CIA budget, which, for instance, is growing faster than the defense budget. The CIA is becoming much more cautious because the public has made it more vulnerable, but also more responsible, so that its leaders ask for written authorization for some covert actions (mostly covert war—secret participation in a war or coup), in order to be able later on to defend it and themselves more effectively in congressional investigation. After strengthened control of Congress over CIA operations, Clair George, CIA director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, started to look at Washington as a "foreign state." This constant balancing of responsibility of Congress with the preeminence of the President in such actions, has given rise to the procedure in which the President is required, within a certain period, even within one day, to inform eight responsible committees ("the gang of eight"). Gregory F. Traverton of the U.S. Council for Foreign Relations thinks that "there are no guarantees against stupid presidential decisions and accompanying public scandals," but that the U.S. President and the Government could finally learn what the public can accept as a correct political move, for instance, regarding the arms trade with Iran, and suchlike, in order that the public could be won over to one side before the congressional verdict, when that secret operation becomes a fact known to everybody, concluding that therefore in the future there will be more overt than covert actions.

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Electronic Changes

In the era of satellites and electronic espionage, the terminology of secrecy from the last century is also changing. The draft Croatian law on the protection of secrecy of information uses such a wide definition that any kind of data about economic strength or weakness can, if the "secretary" deems it necessary, be declared in the national interest or data that is important for the national security. Thus it can happen that what for the IMF or OECD would be ordinary data about the Croatian economy, for NACIONAL or GLOBUS may become a "state secret." Such an approach would mean going beyond doi mol [as published] logic or Vietnamese perestroika because in fact the public is being returned into the mold of an authoritarian regime by systematically widening the dimension of secrecy. It is madness to work criminally against the government in a democratic state, but it would be even greater madness if, in a democratic state, what would work against civic freedoms or the independence of the media were to be declared a state secret, entirely relieving of responsibility anyone who was to irresponsibly prescribe it. Therefore it seems that the law on five sorts of secret (state, military, official, business, and professional) is rather made in order to reduce the (para)political influence of the yellow press rather than to improve the quality of political responsibility of the authority itself. That is visible in both media and political experience so far. How many "state" secrets have been revealed that had to do with indecent or illegal behavior of high officials, and as a rule, none of them ever answer for it!? Since the point obviously could not be—for revealing "state" or "military" secrets, these ministers should be removed from office—it was decided to "remove" those who have demystified certain "state" or "military" secrets as their personal malversation!? That should be achieved by making the betrayal of a "state secret," a criminal act and not by democratizing the process of prescribing what, in a liberal democracy of a western society such as Croatia wants to achieve, can and should be a protected piece of information.

Control of Journalists

The National Assembly should do everything it can to stop being a mere giver of approval for secrets of the executive power and to become more of a verifier and supervisor of what is hidden behind that secret. Otherwise, a possible "Nixon's fall," for abuse of office, could not happen in Croatia, because the high position would itself be used as the place from which the personal abuse would be proclaimed a state secret. Thus, it seems that the Council for the Control of Secrecy, which should be founded as the advisory body of the National Assembly, will in fact function primarily in the control of journalists, in order to check their routine demands for publicity or secrecy of the requested data, and will not function in control of nonroutine executive power and its growing right of discretion in secret activity, or in simple words—working behind the public's back. After totalitarianism, distrust of "secrets" is really widepread.

Croatia: Analyst Previews Army Reorganization

AU0307151496 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 28 Jun 96 p 9

["Exclusive" military analysis by Srdjan Spanovic: "The Number of Guard Brigades and Troops of the HV Will Be Reduced, and the Air Force Will Become the Most Important Part of the Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One can expect that, in reality, in the next couple of years Croatia will reduce the number of its professional guard brigades. In doing so, Croatia will have to completely reorganize them and, apart from small arms, arm them with more modern weapons, that is, weapons systems. Apart from that, it will probably be the case that the assessment of some individuals that the Croatian Army [HV] will be able to fulfill its peacetime functions with only 45,000 men will fail the test of time. At least, if we talk about the next couple of decades. Namely, there are more military experts who claim that the aforementioned 45,000 cannot "cover" the ground forces, air force, and navy, with all branches and professions.

That assessment is only one of the expert opinions regarding the impending reorganization of the Croatian Army. The introduction of emergency procedures in the National Assembly for amending the Defense Law, without much debate in the Internal Policy and National Security Board of the Chamber of Representatives, was immediately commented on by the well informed as being the announcement of significant new changes not only in formal aspects such as terminology, but in the key argument of the reorganization of the Croatian Army.

Namely, Croatia still has not got a conceptual document to provide the starting point for the organization and development of the Croatian Army, even though in 1991 various expert bodies were formed and discussions were conducted to produce answers to the basic questions of the development of the HV. The war pushed aside the academic discussions and peacetime experiences, and the organization was created and changed as the war situation and the country's capabilities dictated, and as we noticed our enemy's weak spots.

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Therefore, lacking a long-term scheme for the development of the HV, the conceptual directions are determined in the short term by law. This time, however, it seems that, mainly on the basis of personal experiences and clear requests resulting from possibly joining the Partnership for Peace, the Croatian Army will be organized for a longer time, although there is no comprehensive concept.

The Partnership for Peace is the first stage of the conceptual and organizational harmonization with NATO standards and the long and painstaking road to joining that key world military organization.

Minister and First Operational Officer

The first step to be taken now is to reorganize the Croatian Army for development in peacetime conditions. Of course, one cannot do that in one step or before eastern Slavonia is completely reintegrated, regardless of the guarantees that everything will be done in a peaceful way. Up to now the Croatian Army has been organized in accordance with the need to defend and liberate the country. Apart from seven professional brigades under the immediate command of the General Staff, there were also reserve and war brigades and Home Guard regiments deployed in a number of regional corps—the Zagreb, Osijek, Gospic, and Bjelovar regional corps. Of course, one must add the remaining parts of the ground forces, as well as the air force and navy.

The peacetime organization of the HV began last year, after the successful operation "Flash" and after operations "Summer '95," "Mistral," and "Storm." The previous organization of the regional corpses was changed and regional corps were formed in Knin, Zagreb, Varazdin, Djakovo, Ston, and Pazin. The navy and the air force, which have grown stronger since the beginning of the war, became more independent organizationally, after the model of military organization in the U.S. Army or British Army. The central body is the General Staff, which unites all branches of the army, as, according to the new law, the elements of the HV will be called.

However, Croatia's overall military policy, with the president of the Republic as commander in chief, will continue to be planned in the Ministry of Defense, which opened the way for the changes in organization with the June proposal for amendments to the Defense Law. Although there are no obstacles to other organizational possibilities, it is certain that in the next, hopefully peaceful, period, the General Staff and the commands of the branches (elements) will deal only with expert planning, and the operational and technical execution of the plan of development of the armed forces and training.

The crucial defense figure, at least for now, will continue to be the minister, while the chief of staff will be, in military terminology, the first operational officer. For a long time there have been rumors not only about divisions and conflicts between senior officers, above all generals who came to the HV from the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and former legionaires, mercenaries, or soldiers who made their names in the Liberation War, who have had additional training in short courses at the Croatian Military School, but also about disturbed relations between the Ministry of Defense or Minister Gojko Susak and individuals from the General Staff. The well informed say that none of the generals from the General Staff can talk to the president unless the defense minister is present. Most of the generals in the Staff think that that is an outrage, and an underestimation of their expert knowledge.

They Do Not Have Lunch With Noncommissioned Officers

It is hard to believe that anything will change regarding these relations at the top of the military, regardless of the formulation suggested in the law that the chief of staff is responsible directly to the commander in chief regarding all questions of commanding the armed forces in peacetime and in war, and to the defense minister regarding all other issues. This formulation precisely determines the responsibility of the members of the General Staff, which is the operational apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. It is on the defense minister's proposal that the commander in chief organizes the General Staff, too. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that the generals will continue to go to the president together with the minister. One recently retired general says of this that it is neither something special, nor humiliation, if it is a part of a practice.

The changes in the law and the age of the present chief of staff, Army General Zvonimir Cervenko also fuel the stories about a new chief of staff. Namely, the new organization of the army will probably require new people, and General Cervenko has fulfilled the legal conditions for retirement. Of course, General Cervenko could remain in office, because the commander in chief could make an exception and prolong his active service. Therefore, at the moment, speculation about names is inappropriate, but one can say with certainty that when the time comes General Zvonimir Cervenko will be replaced by a highly educated general.

That means that the stories that some of the generals who have come to the HV from the Foreign Legion or have been mercenaries in some foreign armies could become chief of staff are unlikely. Regardless of their high ranks in the HV, which is still a growing

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army, and regardless of the fact that the criteria for appointing ranks differs from the criteria in the German, French, or British armies, it is a fact that all our legionaires in the Foreign Legion only achieved the ranks of noncommissioned officers, and, except for the practical part, that is, warfare, their military education has been confined to short courses. The only exception is Zvonimir Skender, who graduated from high military schools and has been an officer.

Despite the high ranks gained in wars, many foreign generals are known for having a somehow contemptuous attitude. Thus—we have heard it from several sources—it has happened that a U.S. general, after official talks, refused to have an official lunch with his Croatian colleague, explaining that he never dined with—noncommissioned officers.

In comparison with the ground forces, the Air Force will have much more significance in the future. The crucial thing will be to find a favorable transitional organization, which will make it possible to acquire quality personnel. The periods of the highest flying capabilities of existing personnel are coming to an end, and the new generations have had no opportunity to educate themselves simultaneously during the war. It is the most lethal and the most efficient part of every army, the equipment and training of which results in an easier military success and reduces one's own casualties to a minimum. With the lifting of the arms embargo on the countries of former Yugoslavia, Croatia has the opportunity to purchase large quantities of quality aircraft and military aircraft equipment inexpensively. Because of the large quantities and the price of Soviet-made arms that Germany, Hungary, Poland, and other former countries of the "socialist camp" want to sell, and Russia itself wants to get rid of its arms surplus, Croatia will probably be buying that military equipment. Therefore, regardless of one's wishes, one should not expect a large-scale purchase of U.S., British, or Israeli supersonic fighter-bombers.

The sophisticated electronic equipment, which the Air Force needs, is another matter. Bearing in mind our needs, it is better for us to buy better quality and more expensive Western, primarily U.S., equipment.

Croatia can develop its navy entirely independently sell its own production of modern combat ships on world markets. Also, probably, there will be no big changes in organization.

Americans as the Model

The expert with whom we talked explains the proposal for a reduction in the number of professional brigades by the fact that only in that way can one ensure they are fully equipped and reinforced, and also improve their professional quality. It is a matter not only of the attitude of soldiers toward the job in peacetime but also the attitude of the state toward them. As our collocutor says, the U.S. Army should be the model we should look to. The U.S. Army, apart from securing its professionals' existence if they do not want to stay in the army after the expiration of the second five-year contract, also grants them a certain amount of money with which they can start their own business. In our country, the obligations of the state, starting with the contract for the allocation of apartments to soldiers, are met slowly, and for a long time the salaries have not been an incentive to sign or to prolong a contract.

The system of educating noncommissioned officers and officers through courses, which was created on the basis of the U.S. system, and for which MPRI [[Military Professional Resources Inc.], the company of retired American officers that organizes and carries out military education in foreign countries, initiated by the U.S. Administration, deserves great credit, has proved to be exceptionally efficient. In peacetime, however, the system of education, which is also a consistent part of the army organization, must respect the need to produce highly educated officers. Of the two concepts, the concept of founding military academies, and the concept of studying at civilian faculties and following up with the acquisition of military knowledge, it is more likely that the latter concept will prevail regarding the expenses and annual needs for the HV officers in the future.

According to current information, teams of experienced officers, military experts, have already started work on the definition of the new organization, while the first draft papers for discussions in the narrow circle at the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense will be finished during the summer.

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Poland: Military Daily on Kwasniewski Visit to U.S.

WS0807125896 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 8 Jul 96 p 4

[Article by Maksymilian Berezowski: "The Interests of Polish Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Kwasniewski's first working meeting with President Bill Clinton coincides with heated debates and decisions on the creation of a post-Cold War peace structure in Europe. Thus, the focal point of the talks the Polish president is to hold at the White House, with members of the Clinton administration, and with congressional leaders will be security in Central Europe and military cooperation between Poland and the United States. It is not insignificant that the presidents of the two partner states will meet directly and personally.

Our attention naturally focuses on Poland's accession to the Euro-Atlantic security system of NATO. Insofar as the general decision of enlarging the alliance has been made, the pace and process of integration still remain the topics of discussions, polemics, and various opinions, as the recent session of the U.S. Senate has proved. President Kwasniewski's visit to the capital of the major Western superpower provides us with the opportunity to expoundi our arguments for early and positive solutions. We also want to hear binding declarations. Poland's relations with the United States naturally reach further. We see them to be more than a partnership. This is due to the fact that we belong to the same community of civilization, have similar political orientations, and share strategic interests. This is reflected in many agreements and the involvement of both states in mutually beneficial undertakings. For at least a year now, Polish-U.S. military cooperation has been making considerable progress. New horizons are opening up in the arms industry, particularly as the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces is nearing, which gives opportunities for large-scale transactions and cooperation. These issues will be the main topics of talks during the visit of the Polish president and his delegation to the United States.

In the broader perspective, economic issues are no less important. American companies are at the top of the list of foreign investors in Poland. These investments have not yet exceeded $2 billion, which, we must admit, is not much, considering the U.S. potential and the prospects the 40 million-strong Polish market offers.

Last year the trade balance between Poland and the United States approximated $1.7 billion (less than with any major European country), with a deficit of $0.5 billion—and growing—to our disadvantage. A lot remains to be done in the way of developing trade, encouraging investment, and improving the trade balance.

A further bonding of ties to the United States is a top priority of Polish policy. Poland's attractiveness lies in the fact that it is a reliable political and military partner that provides access to an important strategic and economic zone, that it is a stable democracy that has good relations with all of its neighbors, and that it is an extension of the European zone of stability. This is not insignificant for America; after all, it is also a European superpower. The end of the presidential elections in Russia and the outcome of the runoffs should appease Washington and eliminate temporariness from U.S. strategic thinking.

It may be concluded that President Kwasniewski's visit to the United States, his meeting with President Clinton, talks with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Defense Secretary William Perry, and a presentation of our arguments before various representatives of the U.S. establishment will give the Americans deeper insight into Polish affairs and the situation in Central Europe. This should pave the way for policies taking into account the joint interests of Polish and U.S. security.

Poland: U.S. Defense Official Visits Polish General Staff

LD0807170096 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1450 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 8 Jul—Edward L. Warner, U.S. assistant secretary of defense responsible for strategy and quartermaster functions, familiarized himself with the course of restructuring the Polish Armed Forces at the General Staff of the Polish Army on 8 July, Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, press spokesman of the chief of the General Staff, has reported. During the visit, General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, presented results in the attainment of compatibility and interoperational capability between units and staffs of the Polish Army and the practices of the armies of NATO member states.

Warner and Gen. Wilecki also discussed issues associated with defense planning and "the methods of integration, in the strategic-defense dimension, of the three basic kinds of armed forces," we read in the communique issued by the spokesman. The chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army also informed the U.S. guest about the constitutional provisions on the direction of the Army in times of peace and in case of a threat to the state.

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The U.S. assistant secretary of defense, who is on a three-day visit to Poland, was also familiarized with the functioning of the Duty Operational Services of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic [Dyzurne Sluzby Operacyjne Sil Zbrojnych RP]. Warner also visited the site of the Central Command Position [Centralne Stanowisko Dowodzenia], added Czekierda.

Poland: Government Approves Auschwitz Project, Invites Aid

WS0807135096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6-7 Jul 96 p 2

[Article by "K.Gr.": "Prime Minister and European Jewish Congress on Auschwitz Project; First Declarations of Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The European Jewish Congress is willing to assist in the construction of an international seminar and training center in Auschwitz. On Friday [5 July], representatives of the organization, among them Chairman Edred Taborchnik, met with Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz.*

Before the meeting, Szymon Szurmiej, chairman of the coordinating committee of Jewish organizations in Poland, stated that the congress approves of the government Project for Auschwitz and wishes to lend its support "in the financial and educational sense." The leadership of the congress declared a willingness to cooperate. From what we learned, however, no further details were agreed upon.

Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said that a draft law on relations between the state and the Jewish communities has been submitted to the Sejm. It provides for granting the Jewish communities the same status other churches and denominations enjoy, and for the restitution of Jewish property. Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], gave assurances: "We are thinking of exclusive legislation for the site of the camp and its closest vicinity."

The government Project for Auschwitz, approved by the Council of Ministers on 25 June, provides for the establishment of a congress center. Young people from all over the world would come there to attend courses—among other things, to learn about the tragic history of the camp. The Project for Auschwitz is to be implemented in several stages and completed in 2007. The first stage would be a "strategic government project." The Council of Ministers has placed the head of URM and the minister of culture under an obligation to prepare it in detail by 15 September of this year. It has also asked the minister of finance to provide for outlays on preliminary expenses in the 1997 budget law. The first step would be to order the protected zone by liquidating a warehouse and a restaurant and rerouting transportation lines. Having approved the project, the government said it is counting on international assistance in the implementation of further stages.

Poland: ROP To Run in Elections Without Solidarity

WS0807142396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6-7 Jul 96 p 2

[Article by "M.D.Z., P.W.R.": "Olszewski Warns Trade Union Members About Their Own Leaders; ROP Will Build a Coalition Without Solidarity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] will build an election coalition without Solidarity ["S"]. "Secret negotiations between 'S' and the Freedom Union [UW] suggest that the scenario of 1989, when the Solidarity victory was wasted and brought the old party nomenklatura* back to power, is being staged," wrote [ROP Chairman] Jan Olszewski in a statement issued on Friday [5 July]. "S" Spokesman Piotr Zak said he was surprised by Olszewski's statement: "Certain things, such as talks with UW in the wings, are a figment of the ROP head's imagination."

Asked at a news conference held after a session of the ROP leadership where the reports on covert talks between "S" and the UW originated, Olszewski quoted an official letter [UW Chairman] Leszek Balcerowicz wrote to the presidium of the ROP congress. It indicated that talks did take place and that certain agreements were probably reached—for example, on a joint ticket in the Senate elections.

The ROP chairman claims "the resolution passed by the 'S' congress irrevocably rejects an alliance with ROP and attempts to position Solidarity in a 'reform coalition' within which the trade union would be forced to promote antiemployee and antiunion groupings." "One of them is the 100 Movement," Jan Olszewski explained.

Asked whether given the circumstances ROP intended to run in the elections on its own, the former prime minister said that his party will try to build a coalition. "Cooperation with the rural Solidarity is settled, but, within the Solidarity Electoral Initiative also, there are groupings that should be treated seriously. We want our broad bloc to include not only political organizations but also various social groups, traders, manufacturers, small Polish business," said Olszewski. "Our electorate consists predominantly of people with higher education and entrepreneurs and not only the unemployed, as the press often reports," added Andrzej Kierylo, a member of the ROP Board.

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ROP has no intention of instigating supportive "networks" of company commissions within "S." "This is for the trade union members to resolve. If such networks do emerge, however, we will have to do something about it," said Jan Olszewski.

Olszewski Is Not Without Fault

Commenting on the statements made by Jan Olszewski, "S" Spokesman Piotr Zak said the trade union is well aware what type of groupings the "S" Election Initiative consists of. This is no time, however, "to create chasms if you want to win with the postcommunists."

"Jan Olszewski is not without fault. Under his government, 'S' staged three nationwide protests," said Zak. He added that the "S" leadership wishes to continue talks with ROP, especially because the resolution of the trade union's congress has placed them under the obligation to do so: "To talk, however, you need two sides willing to make concessions."

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Romania: Commentary Calls Hillary Clinton Visit 'a Failure'

AU0807175296 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 3 Jul 96 p 1

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "Mrs. Hillary Clinton's Visit—A Failure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As one could notice, Mrs. Hillary Clinton's visit to Bucharest has enjoyed intensive and abundant preparations in the pages of our newspaper: We extensively presented the biography of America's First Lady, details of her schedule, and made—unfortunately unsuccessful—efforts to obtain, through our correspondents in Washington, an interview with our distinguished guest. All this was crowned by the publication in the 1 July issue, on the day of Mrs. Clinton's arrival, of her huge picture with the caption "Welcome, Hillary!" in addition to calls to Bucharest residents, urging them to come and see America's First Lady at noon in Bucharest's Revolution Square. We used so much of this precious media ammunition for two reasons: The first was the belief that Mrs. Hillary Clinton's visit was an outstanding event. Although it was supposed to be an unofficial tour and Mrs. Hillary Clinton does not hold a high-ranking position in the hierarchy of the U.S. Administration, nevertheless, her visit to Romania and to the east [of Europe] had the significance of a major gesture within the framework of U.S. foreign policy. Just as Mrs. Clinton claimed before her European tour, America's First Lady visiting the communist space was due to a signal given by President Bill Clinton to this part of the world that America is standing by us. The second reason was our belief that one should not spare a single drop of journalistic sweat to make a large number of Bucharest residents come to see Mrs. Clinton in Revolution Square. It was a good opportunity to reassert the fact that, for us Romanians, America will not only be a fascination, but also a friend to whom we can turn with complete confidence. The magnificence of the festivities in Revolution Square, which we envisaged overfilled with enthusiastic people carrying warm smiles and waving American flags, would have marked 1 July 1996 in the pages of our post-December history. Dominated by this thought, I switched on the television to follow the PRO TV station's live coverage of the meeting in Revolution Square between Bucharest residents and Mrs. Clinton. At the end of the relay, I switched off the television set with a feeling of sadness in my soul. The Revolution Square event was an immense failure. Had I not known that the star of the event was the elegant lady who is Bill Clinton's wife, I would have said that it was a flop. From the very beginning, I was shocked by the small number of Bucharest residents who came to the square. Although in yesterday's issue of our paper we reported and joked about the "Down with Iliescu" slogan that was chanted by a portion of those who gathered in the square, I could not say that I enjoyed the moment. Certainly, the embittered anti-Iliescu people did not miss an opportunity to show again their antipathy towards the current president. However, the central figure of the event was Mrs. Clinton. Other slogans might have been closer to what we might call a warm welcome. I could forget about the small number of those present and that the thoughts and feelings expressed were not directed against the distinguished representative of the United States but against the resident of the Cotroceni Palace [Iliescu], had I not seen with complete amazement the immense bustle created around Mrs. Clinton by the American secret service. America's First Lady moved and spoke in a huge empty space, far not only from those Bucharest residents who had come to see her, but also from the television cameras. The general impression was disappointing. Mrs. Clinton placed this eastern European tour under the sign of the will to express America's affinity to the states that had barely emerged from communism. This would have required her plunging into a mass of people who saw and continue to see in Bill Clinton's wife the long-awaited America in these parts of the world. However, the place of this anticipated picture was taken by a silhouette wandering into a cold and unwelcoming immensity. Was this the paranoia of the American secret service? Was it the mistake of those who prepared the visit? It is difficult to find the right answer. But one thing is nevertheless certain, namely that Mrs. Clinton's presence in Bucharest's Revolution Square was, in the eyes of those who came to see her there and those who watched the event on television, the symbol of an America completely different from the one that we all knew. I also mentioned before that, during my visit to the United States, I was pleasantly surprised by the typical American casualness, by that direct and informal contact with a guest that the residents of that continent over the ocean are capable of. Under the sign of this typical American informality, I was expecting Mrs. Clinton to offer us the image of a warm, friendly America that is ready to talk to us—the East—as equals. The festivities in Revolution Square brutally contradicted this expectancy. The picture presented by Mrs. Clinton, the vastness of a square and separated by fences from the masses of people, made me think of America with certainly that between that country and those in the East there is a huge distance. Instead of bringing America closer to us Romanians, Mrs. Clinton's visit moved it further away, in a disastrous way.

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Romania: Iliescu Returns From Salzburg Economic Summit

AU0807194796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania's President Ion Iliescu returned this evening from Salzburg, where he had been participating in the proceedings of the economic summit of Central and East European countries. In his statement on arrival at Otopeni Airport, the Romanian head of state praised the usefulness of this meeting, which offered an opportunity to 10 heads of state and government from Central and East Europe to present their own views on the European integration process and EU expansion, on European and regional security, and on the results of the elections in the Russian Federation.

Referring to the dinner debate on investment opportunities in Romania, the last event of the Romanian delegation's visit to Austria, which was attended by representatives of business and financial circles from several countries, President Iliescu said that it occasioned an active dialogue on concrete aspects of facilities granted to foreign investors, on capital markets in Romania, and on projects for Europe's interconnection, through Romania, to Central Asia and the Caspian zone. The Romanian head of state also said that he had encouraged foreign investors not to be afraid to come to Romania and had assured them that, regardless of the prospects of the next general elections and the future configuration of Parliament, all the political forces in Romania favor the consolidation of the democratic processes, the promotion of reform, and the country's integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, our correspondent Sorina Man reports.

Romania: Possible End of PDSR-PUNR Accord Viewed

AU0507161896 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 29 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by Irinel Radulescu: "PDSR-PUNR, a Protocol That Has Lasted Too Long"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before the local elections, the general opinion, even of those who are regarded as political analysts, was that the PDSR-PUNR [Party of Social Democracy of Romania-Romanian National Unity Party] divorce was imminent. Logically, that is what should have happened, if one just considered the PUNR's attacks on the PDSR, as well as the possibility that the PDSR, once released from the protocol, would engage in a real struggle for Transylvania. The PDSR even became bellicose in its declarations, announcing that the breach was just a matter of hours away. However, those hours dilated astronomically and Gheorghe Funar's party [PUNR] was incapable of doing several things simultaneously, that is, to give up the benefits of power and to take care of the local elections as well. The PDSR was caught in this trap of "a negative signal given before the local elections, combined with the establishment of a new government." Could it not have simply reshuffled the government, which would have been accepted even by those members of parliament who belong to the opposition, if the PDSR had submitted such a reshuffle to parliament? Thus, tacitly, through a joint understanding, everything was postponed until after the local elections.

However, after the elections one could see why the PDSR did not dare to break with the PUNR and start an offensive for Transylvania. In practical terms, the support that it enjoys in that region is minimal, because Transylvania has been conquered by the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]. The only PUNR oasis that could be connected to the PDSR is Cluj County. Although insignificant at a national level, this breach in the opposition was considered by the PDSR as an "oxygen source," so it decided that "there is no question of breaking the protocol."

The PUNR felt this and now it is playing the winner. It is attacking on all fronts not only the PDSR leadership, but also President Iliescu, and is making declarations of war and calculations. "The PDSR suffered real losses in these local elections mainly because of the policy promoted by its government. It is clear that the act of ruling will also affect us, and so we must leave it as soon as possible," says a PUNR vice president. However, a decision on this can be taken only by the National Council, which is to be held this summer. What this decision will be, not even Ioan Gavra [PUNR vice president] is able to tell. Although half of the party's branches are in favor of breaking the protocol, Funar has enough power of persuasion to turn their decision upside down. Especially considering that ministries, prefect offices, and other feathered nests for the PUNR are in question. The PUNR's dilemma currently is more than a Caragiale-type [Romanian playwright] hesitation. "If we break up before the elections, we leave the country without a government; if we continue up to the elections, we have to continue also during the time of elections, that is during the election campaign." How the PUNR will emerge from this "confusion" seems to be the PDSR's problem.

Although currently busy recovering after the cold shower of the local elections, to find a plausible explanation for the poor results it obtained—one that is also acceptable to President Iliescu—and mainly to find scapegoats, the PDSR is also covertly concocting a

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solution for this protocol. Mr. Oliviu Gherman [PDSR president], who is an expert in statistics, makes calculations about costs and benefits. The closest to reality would be to break the protocol. However, a possible solution could be a government reshuffle, in which, for the eye of the public, two or three PDSR ministers would have to be replaced (there is already talk that Miron Mitrea [president of the "Fratia" TU Confederation] himself might become a future minister), and in the PDSR's interest, PUNR ministers would also have to be replaced. Four months before the elections nobody is going to challenge the government, while the PDSR could acquire enough freedom to engage in a real campaign to conquer Transylvania. Moreover, the "realists" in the PDSR (it is to be seen whether they are able to impose their will) have reached the conclusion that cohabitation with the PUNR until autumn will not only do a great electoral disservice to the party, but will also sever the bridges of negotiations with other political forces. After the PDSR Executive Bureau meeting scheduled for next week, it will be seen if the "realistic calculations" or the "dreamy" ones will win. The idea of the party having been divided into these two groups belongs to Oliviu Gherman.

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Slovenia: Thaler, Croatia's Granic Brief Press on Visit

AU0507084396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic paid a brief working—and, as it appears, also rather fruitful—visit to Slovenia this afternoon. First he held talks with Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler, and toward the end of his visit also with Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek. The foreign ministers held a news conference after the talks, from which we have a report by Nadja Pengov:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] So what is the result of the visit by Croatian Foreign Minister Dr. Granic in Ljubljana? First Zoran Thaler:

[Thaler] I can state with particular satisfaction that the issue that has unnecessarily burdened our relations lately and caused numerous problems primarily for Croatian pensioners—that is, for Croatian citizens receiving Slovene pensions—that this question was resolved with today's agreement by the health ministers of both countries.

[Pengov] And second.

[Thaler] We also exchanged a note, that is, we reached an agreement on the important issue of the division of obligations stemming from the 1983 Rome Treaty.

[Pengov] The economics ministers are also to meet as soon as possible to initial the agreement on the Krsko nuclear power plant, while the justice ministers should initial an agreement on ownership and legal relations. [Word indistinct] on the foreign currency debt of the former Ljubljanska Banka will continue, Thaler says. The work within the state commission for borders is also progressing well and should continue to do so.

Like Thaler, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic described the talks as open and friendly. He was satisfied that they had achieved concrete results. In the name of his country he congratulated Slovenia for its EU associate membership, and also gave thanks for our active role in Croatia joining the Council of Europe.

Dr. Granic believes that the agreement on ownership is very close to a final solution; as for the Krsko nuclear power plant he says that a serious meeting is required at which they would agree on some burning issues, and then also on the final agreement.

In connection with the foreign currency deposits of the Ljubljanska Banka he said that [word indistinct] are (?necessary). He also said:

[Granic] If considerable progress is accomplished with regard to Ljubljanska Banka, then this will create the preconditions for the signing of all the other agreements.

[Pengov] Dr. Granic today again repeated the assurances that the fishing agreement in no way prejudiced the border between the countries. [end recording]

Slovenia: EC Said To Influence Antinuclear Referendum

AU0507142996 Paris AFP in English 1406 GMT 5 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, July 5 (AFP)—The European Commission [EC] on Friday denounced allegations by EU MPs who charged that the commission had scuppered a proposed anti-nuclear energy referendum in Slovenia.

"These allegations are unfounded," stressed Nico Wegter, spokesman for European commissioner Hans van den Broek, in charge of external relations with eastern Europe.

He was reacting to charges made by liberal deputy Carlos Pimenta, of Portugal, who said that a recent tour of Belgian, German, and Swedish nuclear sites organized by the European Commission for Slovenian reporters had contributed to the failure of the referendum.

The media tour "without question was one of the reasons why the anti-nuclear movement failed to gather the 40,000 signatures needed for the referendum in Slovenia," Pimenta said.

"This initiative by the commission amounts to an outrageous attempt to influence public opinion at a specially sensitive time in Slovenia and is also a serious violation of the commission's neutral position concerning the use of nuclear energy," he added.

But Van den Broek retorted that the media tour had been organized at the request of Slovenian authorities to "discuss security issues and the problem of processing nuclear energy waste," his spokesman quoted him as saying.

"There is no direct link between the visit and the referendum in Slovenia," Wegter said, adding that the tour financed by the commission was not aimed at promoting nuclear energy.

In response to charges that the visit had also been organized by the Brussels based European nuclear energy lobby group FORATOM, Wegter said the group had only facilitated access to the nuclear sites for the journalists.

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Slovenia: Experts Fear SFRY Assets To Be Used To Thank Milosevic

AU0407090496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As a part of the third round of negotiations on the legal succession to the former Yugoslavia, Slovene negotiating team chief Miran Mejak and international community negotiator Sir Arthur Watts met in Brussels today. Our correspondent Edo Zitnik reports the details of the talks:

[Begin recording] Slovenia only agrees to a division of assets of the former Yugoslavia that is consistent with the ruling of the Badinter arbitration, namely that Yugoslavia ceased to exist with the disintegration, and that the countries that emerged on its territory are entitled to its assets.

After this round of talks with the negotiators of all the former republics, Sir Arthur Watts will probably prepare an informal draft of a memorandum on the division of the Yugoslav assets. In it he will unveil what will probably be a compromise formula. If the formula proves acceptable to all sides, an official agreement on the division of assets could be signed by the end of the year.

According to our negotiator, Dr. Miran Mejak, Slovenia will be forced to reject even the unofficial draft of the division formula if it were to debase or invalidate the ruling of the Badinter arbitration. It seems that Slovenia suspects that Sir Arthur will try to find a compromise on the division formula, which will probably be at the expense of the maximum negotiating stances of all sides. Mejak also said that Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] probably share a similar opinion, as these republics and Slovenia are supposedly, at least in principle, unanimous in their negotiating stance with Sir Watts, who is talking to each republic independently. Sir Arthur Watts will receive their delegations and the FRY delegation in the next few days.

Slovenia's concrete proposal today was that the foreign currency assets of the former Yugoslavia should, prior to the signing of the agreement on division, be deposited in a special bank account. This would precipitate any possible foot-dragging in the division after the reaching of the division agreement. Sir Arthur Watts has recently stated that ultimately a certain political agreement on the division of assets among the countries of the former Yugoslavia will probably be required. This supports the belief among Slovene expert circles dealing with this matter that the international community is to an extent trying to thank Serbian President Milosevic for his cooperativeness when it comes to the problem of division of the Yugoslav assets, too. [end recording]

Slovenia: Ljubljana Reportedly To Modify Stand on Succession

LD0507171396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1645 GMT 5 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, July 5 (TANJUG)—Slovenia is ready to agree to certain changes in the Badinter Commission's conclusions on the succession of the former Yugoslavia, head of the Slovenian delegation for succession Miran Mejak has said.

'Slovenia would agree to have some of the commission's views which are infeasible changed in an agreement mandatory for all successor states,' Mejak said after his delegation conferred with international mediator for succession Arthur Watts in Brussels Wednesday.

Mejak did not elaborate which 'changes' he had in mind.

Slovenia had up to now categorically insisted on absolute respect for all stands adopted by the European Union commission, headed by Robert Badinter of France, which has taken the view that the former Yugoslav Federation has disintegrated.

However, the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro insists that the former Yugoslav Federation has been broken up by the succession of first Slovenia and then Croatia.

The Slovenian delegation proposed in the third round of talks with Watts that the former Yugoslavia's frozen foreign-currency reserves be transferred to a special account in a foreign bank and be used on the basis of an agreement of the successor states.

Financial experts in Ljubljana estimate that the former Yugoslavia's foreign-currency reserves stood at about six billion dollars at the time of Slovenia's secession.

Mejak said his delegation expected an agreement on the division of the foreign-currency reserves to be reached by the end of the year.

He said the agreement primarily depended on the stands of the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Watts did not present his stand on Slovenia's demands.

He will meet in Brussels Monday with the Yugoslav delegation and then with the delegations of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia [FYROM—Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and Croatia.

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According to sources close to the Slovenian delegation, Watts will present by the end of July a draft document on the resolution of the basic succession issues.

The fourth round of the separate talks is scheduled for September.

The international mediator's office has said that Watts' first meeting with the delegations of all states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia could take place in October.

Slovenia: EU Agreement Boosts Drnovsek's Popularity

AU0407094396 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 26 Jun 96 pp 1, 3

[FBIS Summary] The results of the monthly public opinion poll on the popularity of the parties are summed up by Vlado Miheljak, who notes that the telephone poll was carried out on 19 June among 672 randomly chosen subscribers.

"It appears that the successful completion of the negotiations on EU rapprochement yielded additional support for those among the public who identify with these efforts. Drnovsek's cabinet, which in the months since the disintegration of the tripartite coalition suffered a considerable drop in popularity, has during the past month again reached the magic barrier of 60 percent support. The June results and relatively high support last month (58 percent) decidedly improved its overall rating," Miheljak observes in his introduction.

He notes that "after a long time the so-called center-left option again has a considerable advantage. However, the Democrats have had the most reason for satisfaction over the past few months, as they are turning from a 'pocket party' into a party that can with its support compare with the likes of the Slovene Christian Democrats, the United List of Social Democrats, and also the Slovene People's Party."

An accompanying chart shows respondents' answers to the question of which party they would vote for if the election were held now:

Democratic Party—4.5 percent

Liberal Democracy of Slovenia—19.5 percent

Slovene Social Democratic Party—7.1 percent

Slovene People's Party—5.5 percent

Slovene Christian Democrats—5.3 percent

United List of Social Democrats—5.5 percent

Greens of Slovenia—1.9 percent

Other—1.4 percent

Do not know—27.9 percent

Would not vote—18.3 percent

Another graph also shows trends in support for Drnovsek's government over the past 10 months. According to the chart, the government reached its highest support in November 1995 with 64 percent. After November this support appears to have declined steadily until February 1996, when it hit its lowest point at 52 percent. Since February the government's popularity has been rising steadily by approximately 1 percent each month, according to the graph.

Slovenia: B-H Boycott of Slovene Goods Called 'Irrational'

AU0907122196 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 8 Jul 96 p 3

[Commentary by Boris Jez: "Hasan Muratovic's 'Yugoreflex'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The call of Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic for a boycott of Slovene goods had not been anticipated, but it did not come as a surprise. It represents a sort of "Yugoreflex," a spontaneous reaction loaded with a medley of ideological elements, stereotypes, and emotionally charged reactions to what are sometimes the unpleasant situations created by life. The political leadership in Sarajevo reacted to Slovenia's decision to introduce visas for their citizens as furiously, chaotically, and irrationally as a prepotent suitor. It seems that the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina still see themselves as a sort of kin of Slovenia, which supposedly gives them certain special rights, and they also still imagine that they are at the center of international attention.

The truth is, unfortunately (?), somewhat different because Bosnia has been in "the second league" of international events for quite some time and the states in its surroundings are gradually, but definitely, restoring order and normalizing themselves. A part of this process of normalization, at least for the time being, is the Slovene visa situation because any country protects its own interests first and foremost and, of course, does not want the waves of the war crisis zone to spill over onto its territory. Slovenia's decision to introduce visas for Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens is, therefore, a rational step, but not necessarily a welcome, most appropriate, or politically most productive step.

Hasan Muratovic's government responded to it with certain countermeasures that we can also understand and acknowledge (internal political reasons), but which are

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irrational. What, for example, is the purpose of "retaliation" against Slovenia when visas are needed for Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens in 90 percent of all countries in the world? We could also ask why Sarajevo, for example, does not demonstrate the same determination toward the Germans and others, but that definitely would not make much sense. It is evident, therefore, that all this is a reflection of an operatic realpolitik. One has to crouch before the big and the powerful ones, but one can pour venom on small and trivial Slovenia, which is also in one's "sphere of interest" to boot.

Most people will have no problems reconciling themselves with the fact that Slovene citizens will in the future require visas for travel to Bosnia-Herzegovina since this is a negligible destination in terms of tourism, while business always finds a way. The argument that visas will block business cooperation are trivial, and they conceal the essence, that is, the political "psychological" aspect of the problem. Here, with its appeal for a boycott of Slovene products, Muratovic's government has overstepped all boundaries of reason as Slovenia has all these years been one of Bosnia-Herzegovina's most reliable allies. Not to mention the refugees to which we still play host, the support in the international sphere, the assistance in arms, food, medication, and now even in railroad engines, as this might be in "poor taste."

It is not in poor taste, however, to remind Muratovic and our readers, too, that this is not the first boycott of Slovene goods that we have encountered and ultimately survived. The first to think of such "tricks" was Slobodan Milosevic in the times of the so-called antibureaucratic revolution, but, all praise for Slobo, he never sank so low. High politics usually leaves such "dirty details" to the alleged spontaneity of the domestic political scene and does not soil its hands with them. However, it is outright scandalous that the prime minister (in the absence of any other political mechanisms?) places himself at the head of the "indignant and enraged nation."

The dispute is nowhere near as important for Slovenia as it may appear superficially, even if a construction company or two, doomed to go bankrupt anyway, may remain without a job. It is far more significant for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will, through such a policy, isolate itself even further, as Slovenia is ultimately its "natural barrier" on the way to Europe. Last, but not least, the question will soon arise of whether boycotts and similar "fundamentalist" political reflexes are not merely the other side of the medal of the policy that physically attacked its political rival Haris Silajdzic in Cazin. Those who follow the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina closely have been justified in wondering for quite some time in which direction "the regime" of Alija Izetbegovic is going.

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Federal

FRY: PM Kontic Meets European Statesmen in Salzburg

LD0807191396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1850 GMT 8 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Salzburg, July 8 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said Monday that European leaders had expressed readiness to restore and promote bilateral cooperation with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and back its reintegration in the international community.

Kontic, who heads the Yugoslav delegation attending the three-day economic summit of Eastern and Central European Countries, told Yugoslav press that he had met Monday Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Poland Gyula Horn and Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, and Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky.

During the meeting with Cimoszewicz it was agreed to raise the level of diplomatic representations in Warsaw and Belgrade to the level of ambassadors and to renew inter-state agreements, Kontic said.

Kontic accepted the invitation to visit Poland by the end of this year and agreed with his counterpart to simplify the procedure of granting visas.

Poland unreservedly supports Yugoslavia's reintegration in the international community, Cimoszewicz said.

Kontic and Horn noted that relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary were improving in all fields and agreed to accelerate the drawing up of inter-state agreements, especially as regards incentives to investments and avoiding double taxation.

Recalling that Hungary had advocated Yugoslavia's reintegration in all international financial and trade organizations, Horn said it would continue this policy in the future too.

Kontic and Kuchma pointed to the positive development of economic cooperation which could reach two billion dollars a year.

The prime ministers of Yugoslavia and Ukraine agreed to eliminate visas and to accelerate the drawing up of a political agreement on friendship and cooperation expected to be signed at the end of this year.

Kontic pointed to Ukraine's contribution to resolving Yugoslav crisis and maintaining peace in the territory of the former federation, and expressed gratitude for its humanitarian aid to FRY and the refugees it is hosting.

Kuchma underlined that Ukraine would continue insisting of the lifting of U.N. sanctions on FRY and its reintegration in international commodities and capital markets.

Kontic and Vranitzky discussed the resumption of bilateral cooperation and its expansion to new projects and fields.

They also agreed to intensify high-level bilateral contacts and to adopt new agreements to this effect, especially in the fields of traffic and scientific, technical and cultural cooperation.

Vranitzky hailed Yugoslavia's role in implementing the peace process and expressed full understanding for its reintegration in the international community.

FRY: FM Milutinovic Views Sofia Forum, Bulgarian Minority

AU0807164696 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 8 Jul 96 p 6

[Interview with FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic by an unidentified STANDART NEWS reporter; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [STANDART NEWS] Minister Milutinovic, do you believe the rights of the Bulgarian minority in the Tsaribrod region are protected?

[Milutinovic] I do not understand your question. Which Bulgarians are you referring to? I do not know of such a town. No such town exists.

You are probably thinking of the people who live in Dimitrovgrad. You reject that name. Why make a drama out of it? I used to be education minister, and I visited this part of Serbia millions of times, the part that you call the Western Outlands, whereas for us they are the eastern ones. The Bulgarians there enjoy all their rights. They have their language and schools. We believe they have all the conditions and rights due them. No such problem exists for us.

[STANDART NEWS] Mr. Milutinovic, what is your opinion of the Sofia meeting?

[Milutinovic] We welcome Bulgaria's initiative in calling this meeting. The very fact that such a meeting was held for the first time in six years is a very positive development, despite the absence of Macedonia [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM]. However, the level of representation at the meeting was more impressive than our boldest expectations.

[STANDART NEWS] In your view, did Macedonia's absence affect the Sofia meeting?

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[Milutinovic] Yes and no. I personally regret the absence of the Macedonian delegation. I think the issue should have been resolved earlier and some kind of compromise reached instead of being put off until the last moment.

[STANDART NEWS] In your opinion, why did Croatia and Slovenia attend only as observers?

[Milutinovic] They want to be part of Central and Western Europe. That is a fine aspiration on their part, but nothing will come of it unless they participate in regional cooperation in the Balkans. I cannot understand why everyone wants to dissociate themselves from the Balkans. If the Balkans were a powder keg in the past, that does not mean they will remain that way in the future. All the old civilizations were gathered in the Balkans, and we have nothing to be ashamed of.

FRY: Accord Reached With Croatia on POW's, Missing Persons

AU0807143796 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Jul 96

[Report by Dragan Mihovic on a news conference by members of the FRY Committee for Humanitarian Issues on the talks with the Croatian Committee for Missing Persons in Belgrade on 8 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The agreement reached stipulates that the two sides should exchange without delay all information on those imprisoned, arrested, and missing, as well as on those killed in the conflict throughout former Yugoslavia; that lists of names of such people should be drawn up and obituaries issued by 1 September 1996, and that an exchange should take place of lists of names of those held by either of the two sides on any grounds, who appear on the lists of missing people of either side by 20 August 1996.

The FRY Committee says that it has released all prisoners of war, while the Croatian Committee claims that the release of the remaining prisoners of war is under way and that this process may be completed by 20 August this year. During the work of the expert groups, the FRY side insisted that the fate of the pilots and soldiers of Donje Kolibe, the reservists of the Niksic and 2d Savnik groups, as well as other individual cases from the list marked 61 be resolved.

The Croatian side insists on finding out the fate of pilot Rudolf Perisin, and 64 others—the Croatian side submitted evidence that they had been captured and taken away—as well as the remaining names on list 24, who the FRY side had already said were alive. The Croatian side promised that it would submit exact and complete information in connection with the attack on Krajina and other places.

Since the number of missing and killed is not final and that political manipulation is still possible in this connection, it was said at today's news conference that all the family members who submitted requests would get written responses on the fates of the people sought. Families whose members are missing have been asked to file requests for information at any Red Cross office. [passage omitted]

FRY: Government Committee Notes 'Good Cooperation' With IFOR

LD0507163196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1559 GMT 5 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 5 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government committee for cooperation with the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) on Friday described as good cooperation between relevant Yugoslav bodies and IFOR.

In a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, the committee reviewed a large number of issues it is in charge of, stressing Yugoslavia's great contribution to the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the region, the Yugoslav information secretariat said in a statement.

The committee said federal and republican bodies had held about 20 meetings with U.N. and IFOR officials since the committee's last session and discussed current issues concering cooperation and exchange of information.

The issues mainly referred to privileges and immunity of members of U.N. missions, activity of U.N. observers deployed to the Prevlaka promontory, the visa regime, U.N. financial commitments, the implementation of an agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO on transit arrangements, the committee said.

Other issues vital for the implementation of the peace process in the former Yugoslavia were also discussed, it said.

It said the status of members of U.N. missions deployed to or transitting Yugoslavia was regulated in keeping with the missions' mandates determined by relevant U.N. resolutions so that the U.N. personnel's requests for additional privileges would be dealt with separately in direct contacts with U.N. officials.

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Serbia

Serbia: Government Party Favors Autonomy Solution for Kosovo

LD0807220796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2057 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Jagodina, 8 Jul (TANJUG)—Dusan Mihajlovic, chairman of the New Democracy [Nova Demokratija-ND—government coalition party], said in Jagodina this evening that the ND party is in favor of a historic Serbian-Albanian agreement in Kosovo-Metohija as a basis for a stable Serbia and the development of both nations.

"Such an agreement will enable the economic and democratic development of both nations and the return of the Kosovo Albanians to the democratic and parliamentary life of Serbia and Yugoslavia as their mother country," Mihajlovic said at a roundtable discussion organized by the ND in Jagodina.

According to Mihajlovic, Kosovo will enjoy the status of an autonomous region and autonomy that will not threaten the statehood of Serbia and Yugoslavia. In this way, he said, a basis will be created for Serbia and Yugoslavia to open its doors to regional integrations and a stronger flow of people, ideas, goods, and capital through open borders and with adequate trade and customs concessions.

Mihajlovic said that there were some individuals who saw the solution for the Kosovo-Metohija issue in increased repression and a new ethnocentric policy. Others, on the other hand, advocate the idea of dividing, or amputating part of, the territory of Kosovo-Metohija, he said.

"In multinational Serbia, both these solutions will result in sharper ethnic conflicts and eventually in interethnic fighting and war. Regardless of the outcome, this will lead to the dismemberment of Serbia itself," the ND leader said.

"The main advantage of our solution is that Serbia and Yugoslavia, as multinational states with a majority Serb population, are key factors in ethnic coexistence under new conditions and that our solution to the Kosovo problem will entail support from the international community, the kind of support we enjoyed throughout the century," Mihajlovic said. [passage omitted]

Serbia: District Court Sentences 2 for War Crimes

LD0807182196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1715 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sabac, 8 Jul (TANJUG)—The district court in Sabac sentenced today to seven years in prison Dusko Vuckovic (32) alias Repic, accused of committing a war crime by killing 16 and wounding 20 Muslims in the village of Celopek near Zvornik and raping the Muslim (woman) H.C. from Mali Zvornik.

A panel of five judges, chaired by judge Vladimir Bajic, also passed a conditional sentence of one year in prison on Vojin Vuckovic alias Zuco (33), the commander of the Yellow Wasps paramilitary formation, who was charged with illegal possession of arms and impersonation.

The trial started on 22 November 1994. In the preliminary investigation proceedings, the court established, on the basis of the evidence given by the accused Dusko Vuckovic and witness Aco Bajic from Trsic in the Serb Republic, that Vuckovic shot a whole clip of 30 bullets at the Muslims from the nearby village of Divica near Zvornik who were detained in the community hall in Celopek on 27th and 28th April 1992.

Evidence was also produced that he had raped a Muslim woman, H.C., in Radalj near Mali Zvornik. Public prosecutor Branko Njegovan withdrew charges of robbery of the same person.

In his explanation, Judge Bajic said that the length of Dusko Vuckovic's sentence took into account diminished responsibility arising from his mental state during the act, as well as the fact that he had been previously captured and tortured by the Muslim army in eastern Bosnia.

Soldier Vuckovic committed the criminal act of false impersonation in July 1992 when, in his search for fugitive Zvornik lawyer Alija Efendic, he unlawfully detained and interrogated Muslim civilians.

During his arrest on 4 November 1993, a Mauser handgun, a small-caliber Vostok gun, a hunting rifle, and explosives were found in his apartment.

Kosovo

Kosovo: SPS Official Promises Serbs Defense of Province

AU0807164496 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by R. Negojevic: "Against Divisions by Goodwill"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pristina—The day of uprising of Serbia's peoples against fascism—7 July—was celebrated all over Kosovo and Metohija. The central celebration was held at the Memorial Center in Pristina, where Vojislav Zivkovic, chairman of the Regional Committee of the Serbian Socialist Party [SPS] for Kosovo, spoke about the significance of this historic

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date and the current situation in this southern region of Serbia. [passage omitted]

"In Kosovo and Metohija we did not suffer any war destruction, although the architects of the war in the Balkans planned first to ignite the war precisely here. The leadership of Serbia avoided all the dangers caused by the ethnic Albanian separatists, who are the same enemy against whom you, honorable veterans, fought during World War II in Kosovo and Metohija. In this historic place, before the remains of those who gave their lives in that struggle for the fatherland, one ought to say once more that Serbia and Yugoslavia are not calling in question for a single moment the fact that Kosovo and Metohija are integral parts of it and will be defended by all means available!

"We support the peaceful development of the southern province, the involvement of all its citizens in normal political life, the improvement of its economy and living conditions, and the stabilization of the political situation in the region," Zivkovic said, pointing out that "interethnic divisions in Kosovo are not so deep as to stop them from being overcome with the help of reason and good will."

"The majority of citizens in Kosovo support cohabitation, peace, and prosperity, so it is necessary for us to develop new relations in Kosovo and Metohija. There is no recession to old and historically outdated concepts, which use minorities as instruments for the accomplishment of political goals. Serbia will not allow the revival of a situation in this region similar to that created by the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia [whereby Kosovo was made an autonomous province and became largely separate from Serbia]," Zivkovic said.

Kosovo: Agani Denounces 'Cunning Pragmatism' in JUL Program

AU0907091896 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 6 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Mira Markovic and her JUL [Yugoslav United Left] have been heralding the attempts of the Serbian regime to find a group of people in Kosova—no matter the number of them or how much they might have been compromised—to serve the Serbian regime's objectives in Kosova," Dr. Fehmi Agani, vice chairman of the LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] said in a column carried in the last Saturday's [6 July] edition of the Prishtina-based political weekly ZERI. However, "both Mira Markovic (President of the Yugoslav Left—JUL, and wife of the Serbian President Milosevic) and the Serbian regime are very well aware of the fact that such a category of people is not a strong card," Dr. Agani notes. The regime is cognizant that through negotiations with the legitimate representatives of Kosova the Serbian domination in Kosova can never be legalized. Thus, that kind of people would rather serve as a substitute in case agreements fail. In order to be infiltrated amongst the Albanians, JUL has drafted a program on Kosova, which "besides an alleged peace, equality and verbal criticism of nationalism, has nothing a program should include," says Agani.

In a recent interview with the Serbian television, Mrs. Markovic never denounced the current sate of affairs Serbia has created in Kosova, neither she spoke of the future status of Kosova, says Agani, but "still giving herself the right to speak of national interests of Serbs and Albanians."

Without asking Albanians at all what their national interests are, Mira Markovic generously promises that they (Albanians) "could earn living from their work, their children could attend modern schools, they could have their newspapers so to be informed objectively..." This is what the president of JUL sees as national interest of the Albanians, says Agani, calling it a "cunning pragmatism of JUL." "This would mean that Albanians could work and earn living from their work, could have their children educated, could be informed, under the condition they get informed 'objectively,'" meaning the way the Serbian regime provides them with "objective information" but they should give up other demands (sic), says Agani.

What the JUL "program" envisages is a minicultural autonomy for Kosova, says Agani, adding that it can be clearly understood from the way Mrs. Markovic sees nationalism. She only sees the extreme nationalism of "few" Serbs who demand the expulsion of Albanians from Kosova, but fails to say a single word on the Serbian state terror in Kosova, its programs to colonize it, its drives to expel and exterminate Albanians, while calling "Albanian nationalism" the demand of the overwhelming population for their Republic of Kosova, said amongst others Dr. Fehmi Agani in a column with ZERI.

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